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ABSTRACT 
Exposure therapy is a considered to be the treatment of choice for anxiety disorders, 
but mechanisms of change underlying its effectiveness are currently being contested. 
Emotional processing theory postulates that habituation of fear is the primary predictor of 
change during exposure, while inhibitory learning theory challenges that and postulates 
that variability in the intensity of fear is the predictor of change. Moreover, recent 
evidence points towards verbalization of emotion as a predictor of change during exposure 
as well. The present study investigated these predictors using a sample of 41 college 
students in an analog experimental design in the context of an exposure task. The study 
found mixed support that verbalization of emotion plays a role in improving the 
behavioral outcomes after an exposure task. Habituation in fear, controlled for variability 
in the intensity of fear, predicted worse speech performance from before to after the 
experimental task, (β = -.63, p = .001), while variability in the intensity of fear, controlled 
for habituation, improved speech performance (β = .54, p = .008). At the same time, 
habituation in shame, when controlled for variability in the intensity of shame, predicted 
an improvement in state self-esteem from before to after the experimental task (β =.31, p = 
.009), while variability in the intensity of shame, when controlled for habituation in 
shame, predicted state self-esteem deterioration (β = -.35, p = .038). Physiological indices 
indicated that lower heart rate variability during the experimental task predicted worsening 
in self-esteem from before to after the task (β = -.18, p = .034), while habituation in fear 
(r(39) = .40, p = .014) and shame (r(39) = .56, p < .001) was positively correlated with 
parasympathetic nervous system activity when controlled for variability in these emotional 
states. 
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Introduction 
Exposure treatments 
Exposure treatments have been shown to be highly effective alone or in combination 
with cognitive restructuring for a range of anxiety disorders, and are considered to be the 
treatment of choice for some of them (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2004). Despite 
demonstrated and reliable success in treating anxiety, exposure treatments are highly 
underutilized in clinical practice. Research has shown that this underutilization is related 
to the perception by a large number of practicing clinicians that exposure treatments are 
harmful, intolerable, and unethical (Farrell, Deacon, Dixon, & Lickel, 2013). Contrary to 
common misconceptions, exposure therapy does not result in greater drop-out rates than 
other treatments and individuals who undergo exposure treatments usually find them 
tolerable (Wolitzky-Taylor, Viar-Paxton, & Olatunji, 2012). Likewise, there is no 
substantial evidence that exposure therapy is harmful when it is done appropriately. A 
study by Foa et al. (2002) found a temporary exacerbation of anxiety in some clients 
undergoing exposure therapy, but it was not predictive of treatment drop-out or treatment 
non-response. A more recent study of prolonged exposure therapy for chronic post-
traumatic stress disorder in female victims of sexual and nonsexual assault has shown no 
evidence of any reliable exacerbation of trauma or depression symptoms among women 
in exposure treatments (Jayawickreme et al., 2014). In contrast, female survivors who 
were on the waitlist showed a reliable exacerbation of symptoms in the absence of 
treatment. Meta-analyses have shown that exposure strategies for social anxiety alone 
perform as well as cognitive restructuring, social skills training, or a combination of 
exposure with cognitive restructuring (Feske & Chambless, 1995; Deacon & 
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Abramowitz, 2004; Acarturk et al., 2009), and are sometimes superior (Gould, 
Buckminster, Pollack, Otto, & Yap, 1997). Thus, empirical evidence indicates that 
exposure treatments are both tolerable and effective. 
Emotional processing theory 
Arguably the most influential theory to date of how exposure therapy achieves its 
effect is the emotional processing theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 
2006). The theory postulates a model of learned fear, according to which the individual 
forms associations between a stimulus, a response, and their corresponding meaning 
representations (e.g., “this fear response helps deal with that dangerous stimulus”). The 
resulting adaptive fear structures accurately represent reality and enable the individuals 
to avoid danger. In some circumstances, however, maladaptive learning experiences, such 
as psychological trauma, can result in the formation of a pathological, or maladaptive, 
fear structure. In this structure the associations between stimuli, responses, and meaning 
representations inaccurately reflect the situation as dangerous when in reality it is not, 
leading to excessive or inappropriate responses intended to avert the danger that is not 
present.  
According to emotion processing theory, a therapeutic change occurs through 
emotional processing, which involves two critical steps: (1) initial fear activation, and (2) 
habituation of the fear structure both within and between exposure sessions. Habituation, 
indexed by a reduction in fear over time, is believed to occur through the incorporation of 
new information about stimuli, responses, and meaning that is incompatible with it (Foa 
& Kozak, 1986). Initial fear activation occurs when an individual is exposed to cues that 
match closely to the fear structure, evidenced by physiological arousal and self-reported 
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anxiety that exceeds the pre-exposure levels. Furthermore the theory states that a 
decrease in fear within exposure sessions, and a decrease in peak fear levels between 
exposure sessions, indicates the habituation of fear, which serves as an index of 
successful emotional processing (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006). 
Challenges to emotional processing theory 
Recent years have seen the emergence of empirical evidence that does not support 
emotional processing theory's view on what the key therapeutic processes are. Initial fear 
activation, within-session and between-session habituation of fear were found to be 
inconsistently associated with symptom change in exposure treatments for anxiety 
disorders (Craske et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2010; Kircanski et al., 2012; Meuret, Seidel, 
Rosenfield, Hofmann, & Rosenfield, 2012; Wendt, Schmidt, Lotze, & Hamm, 2012). 
Furthermore, even when exposure treatment is initially successful, the previously 
habituated, or "unlearned", fear structure can be reactivated with new strength, especially 
in a context that is different from the treatment context, resulting in a return of fear (Tsao 
& Craske, 2000; Schiller & Phelps, 2011). Thus, while the success of exposure 
treatments is well-documented (as discussed above), the exact mechanisms of change 
remain uncertain. 
Inhibitory learning theory 
One of the newer explanations of the mechanisms behind exposure treatments is the 
idea of inhibitory learning. According to this approach, formerly “habituated” or 
"extinguished" fears are not actually unlearned, but rather are inhibited by new, 
competing learning (Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014). This 
inhibitory process is thought to be central to extinction of learned fears (Craske et al., 
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2008; Craske et al., 2014), and the success of exposure treatments as a consequence. 
Craske and colleagues have proposed a number of changes based on this consideration to 
optimize exposure treatments. For example, in contrast to emotional processing theory's 
habituation approach, the inhibitory learning approach is not concerned with the 
reduction of fear during the exposure session (Craske et al., 2014).  
Culver, Stoyanova, and Craske (2012) found that during exposure procedure for the 
severe fear of public speaking, two predictors of change at 2-week follow-up emerged: 
(a) greater variability in the levels of self-reported fear throughout the exposure predicted 
lower self-reported fear during the follow-up; (b) greater degree of within session 
habituation predicted lower speech duration, indicating worse performance, during the 
behavioral assessment task. The study additionally found an inconsistent association 
between physiological arousal (indexed by heart rate) and the outcomes in that on one 
hand, higher heart rate at the end of exposure predicted lower confidence in one’s 
speaking ability during the one-week follow-up, while on the other hand predicting lesser 
amount of fear during that time as well. 
Kircanski et al. (2012) found that after a series of exposure trials for contamination 
fears, the following predictors emerged at a 2-week follow-up: (a) greater within-session 
habituation of fear and greater between session habituation of arousal (indexed by heart 
rate) predicted less self-reported obsessions; (b) greater variance in self-reported fear 
during exposure predicted lower self-reported fear during the follow-up; (c) greater initial 
fear activation during exposure predicted higher overall levels of fear during the follow-
up. 
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While the studies mentioned above did not find a reliable association between 
physiological arousal and changes in the participants during exposure tasks there may be 
a theoretical reason for its importance as a predictor. There is now converging evidence 
across multiple treatment approaches that moderate levels of arousal must be present in-
treatment for lasting changes in emotional experience in psychotherapy, with too little or 
too much arousal disrupting the consolidation of new meaning, and the elaboration of 
new emotional meaning to compete with the old meaning (Hayes, Beck, & Yasinski, 
2012), supporting the idea that sustained levels of physiological arousal may actually be 
therapeutic.  
Newer evidence strongly suggests that variability in subjective fear plays a very 
important role in the exposure process. Variability in levels of fear may help enhance 
exposure by serving as a variety of internal contexts which are associated with extinction 
learning, and thus new inhibitory learning is more likely to be retrieved as variable levels 
of fear will be elicited in situations outside of the therapeutic exposure context, thereby 
generalizing the new inhibitory learning to contexts other than the exposure sessions and 
protecting against the “return of fear” (Craske et al., 2014). Another explanation for why 
variability in the intensity of fear is therapeutic is based on Rescorla-Wagner theory 
which states that the bigger the discrepancy between the expectation and reality, the 
stronger is the new learning, and thus variability in the intensity of fear may reflect 
changes in the expectancy of negative effect or harm (Kircanski et al., 2012). Thus, 
variability in the intensity of experienced fear is an index of inhibitory learning taking 
place with a variety of potential explanations of how it exerts its effects.  
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An alternative (and perhaps coexisting) possibility is that variability in fear intensity 
may represent increased access to more advanced emotional states. The theory behind 
emotion focused therapy stresses that when a client declares an emotional experience, or 
the researchers focus on it, there is actually a range of emotional experiences happening 
at the same time that are part of that person’s immediate experience. The reason for that 
is that, according to this theory, any emotional experience is a dynamic system with a 
natural ebb and flow based on dominant and sub-dominant experiences. Where one 
emotion becomes less salient, the other, qualitatively different emotion, may move to the 
foreground of emotional experience (Pascual-Leone, Paivio, & Harrington, 2016). An 
example of that would be a situation in which an individual who is experiencing grief 
shifts from an experience of anger regarding the loss towards sadness, even as both 
emotions are co-existing aspects of that person’s immediate experience. Thus, a 
conceptual leap from variability in one emotion correlating with an increased access to 
other, more advanced emotions, may be a distinct possibility. 
Previous research found that an increased variance in qualitatively different emotional 
states and increased access to adaptive emotions over time was found to distinguish cases 
with good outcomes from cases with bad outcomes in emotion focused therapy (Pascual-
Leone, 2009). Thus, a successful emotional change would not necessarily mean the 
absence of maladaptive emotional states, but rather an increased access to a more flexible 
repertoire of emotion. This flexibility would also imply a more nuanced appraisal of 
feared stimuli which may compete and inhibit the old maladaptive appraisals, as the 
underlying neural mechanisms may suggest. 
Underlying neural mechanisms 
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Emotional experience in general appears to involve two distinct neural systems. The 
first system is responsible for the implicit, nonconscious, visceral, pre-verbal, or bottom-
up, aspects of emotional experience and involves activation of the bilateral amygdala 
(Phelps, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2009), which is also responsible for the acquisition, 
storage, and expression of learned fear. The second system is involved in the explicit, 
conscious, conceptual, verbal, or top-down, aspects of emotional experience. This system 
involves activity of the left amygdala, as well as a conscious cognitive appraisal of the 
emotional significance of external or internal stimuli that engages the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), activation of which is associated with a strong subjective 
experience of emotion (McRae et al., 2012). These neural systems are distinct, even 
though, in practice, they often interact: bilateral damage to the amygdala can prevent fear 
conditioning in humans as evidenced by lack of physiological arousal in the presence of a 
learned fear stimulus despite a conscious, verbal awareness, and understanding of the 
emotional significance of the fear stimulus, which is dependent on the intact hippocampal 
circuits (Phelps, 2005). LeDoux (2013) reported that a conscious feeling of fear 
originates in much the same way as other emotions, such as pride or shame. These 
feelings (i.e., fear, pride, shame) are generated via the cognitive processing of “raw 
neural materials” - in other words, through the interaction of the two neural systems that 
participate in the generation of the implicit-preverbal and explicit-verbal aspects of 
emotional experience.  
These dual systems participate in both appraisal, an evaluation of emotional 
significance of an external or an internal stimulus (Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011), as 
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well as emotion regulation
1
, an arbitration between the conflicting appraisals or 
reappraisals of stimuli, and both automated preconcious as well as controlled conscious 
response through the inhibition of competing appraisals and action tendencies (Etkin et 
al., 2011). When presented with an emotional stimulus, a neural circuit consisting of the 
amygdala, dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC), and dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
(dmPFC) is engaged in the detection, and conscious appraisal of emotional significance 
of that stimulus. Moreover, this neural circuit is recruited during the expression of 
physiological and action tendency fear response to that stimulus. Intentional 
reinterpreting, or reappraisal, of a stimuli's emotional meaning was found to activate both 
dACC and dmPFC (Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bonger, & Wessa, 2010). When there 
are competing appraisals of a stimulus, the amygdala, ventral Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(vACC), and ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) circuit is activated. This circuit 
inhibits competing appraisals and action tendencies, allowing for a course of action to 
take place. 
 There is a remarkable overlap between the neural circuits described above and those 
that are involved in the extinction of learned fear, which has led Quirk and Beer (2006) to 
suggest that extinction of learned fear is a special case of emotion regulation. In addition 
to its role in the expression of physiological and action tendency, the amygdala-dACC-
dmPFC circuit is also involved in the conscious appraisal and reappraisal of a CS, while 
the amygdala-vACC-vmPFC circuit is involved in the inhibition of learned fear response. 
In the course of extinction learning, the vmPFC potentiates its connections to 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that the meanings of these terms appear to be unique to the areas 
of neuroscience, and are somewhat distinct from the clinical field. 
 9 
 
 
hippocampal regions, making extinction a very context-dependent process, accounting 
for the return of fear phenomenon (Quirk & Beer, 2006). Additionally, repeated exposure 
to feared stimuli was found to habituate the response of the amygdala with no 
corresponding change to dmPFC activity (Wendt et al., 2012), possibly elucidating why 
within-session habituation has not been a consistent predictor of long-term fear or 
symptom change, and further solidifying the idea that changes over the course of 
exposure can occur on one level but not on another. In other words, exposure to a feared 
situation may reduce the nonconscious fear reaction, but change little in the conscious 
appraisal of fear stimulus as threatening, thereby likely reducing overall therapeutic 
effectiveness. 
Consistent with previous findings, a model of neurovisceral integration (Thayer & 
Lane, 2000) postulates that what is underlying anxiety disorders is a deficit in the 
inhibitory activity of parasympathetic nervous system. Central autonomic network 
(Bennaroch, 1993) directly influences heart rate variability by sending output to the 
sinoatrial node via stellate ganglia and the vagus nerve (Thayer & Lane, 2009). 
Structurally, the central autonomic network involves a variety of brain regions, among 
them the central nucleus of the amygdala, as well as anterior cingulate and vmPFC 
(Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Thayer and Lane (2000) propose that this central 
autonomic network shares so many commonalities with the neural systems implicated in 
affective processing, such as the anterior executive region (Devinsky et al., 1995), and 
others, that they should be considered the same functional neural network. Indeed, the 
structural overlap between the central autonomic network and the brain regions involved 
in emotion regulation and fear extinction, which were reviewed earlier, is striking. 
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According to neurovisceral integration theory, prefrontal cortex (PFC) exerts inhibitory 
control over the central nucleus of amygdala. When PFC is deactivated, the net result is 
the activation, or disinhibition, of the central nucleus of amygdala, which subsequently 
leads to disinhibition of medullary cardioacceleratory circuits, leading to increased heart 
rate and decreased heart rate variability (Thayer & Lane, 2009). Thayer & Lane (2009) 
suggest that this common inhibitory circuit can be indexed by vagally mediated heart rate 
variability (HRV), that is, the high frequency (HF) component of HRV. Thus, they state, 
vagally mediated HRV can serve as an index of inhibitory control. Other researchers have 
also examined HRV as an index of emotion regulation (e.g., Thayer & Brosschot, 2005; 
Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; Fujimura & Okanoya, 2012; Williams et al., 2015). Thus, 
in the search for an index of inhibitory learning, heart rate variability appears to be a 
more promising candidate than heart rate, in general. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that processing of the emotional stimuli 
during fear exposure involves two levels: a conscious level of verbal appraisals and a 
nonconscious level of physiological and action tendency reactions. In line with this 
reasoning, Catherall (2003) and LeDoux (2013) suggested that nonconscious and 
conscious systems would be affected in different ways by different interventions. 
Catherall (2003), proposed that a certain degree of habituation to distressing stimuli may 
need to be present so that excessive levels of arousal do not interfere with the conscious 
processing of emotion. LeDoux (2013), in turn, proposed that implicit system may be 
more responsive to exposure interventions operating through the extinction process, 
while the explicit system may be more responsive to verbal interventions aimed at 
changing explicit meaning. 
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The role of verbal processes in emotion processing 
Given the dual systems underlying different aspects of emotional experience and the 
fact that they interact, it is not very surprising to find that even when exposure therapy 
that does not include any explicit verbal-cognitive reappraisal strategies it often 
nonetheless involves spontaneous cognitive changes. For example, exposure therapy 
often results in individuals' reduction of the explicit expectation of harm or threat when in 
the presence of what is called a conditioned stimulus, a “threat cue” which signals or 
predicts incoming harm or threat (Hofmann, 2008). The inverse is also true, in that 
explicit “cognitive” processes influence implicit “emotional” ones. Kircanski, Lieberman, 
and Craske (2012) have found that spider-phobic individuals who were verbalizing the 
negative emotions they experienced while approaching a live spider showed reduced 
physiological arousal compared to when they used neutral words or when they were 
instructed not to verbalize at all. Additionally, individuals who used more anxiety or fear 
words in this task had greater physiological reduction of fear during the exposure to a live 
spider. A similar study by Lieberman et al. (2007) found that labeling one's affect during 
exposure to negative images downregulated amygdala activity, indicating reduced 
arousal. Curiously, individuals with alexithymia, a condition characterized by difficulties 
in finding words for and verbalizing emotional experiences (Bermond et al., 2007) are 
particularly prone to low distress tolerance (Rose & Segrist, 2012). Furthermore, these 
individuals have less ability to regulate emotion through a strategy of cognitive 
reappraisal, where one consciously discusses and reformulates one's understanding of 
fearful stimuli (Pollatos & Gramann, 2012). One of the possible mechanisms at play here 
is that if indeed being able to articulate emotional experience verbally can downregulate 
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arousal, then not being able to do so may contribute to lower ability to regulate emotion 
as seen in alexithymia. 
Evidence points that verbalization of emotion is an important variable that influences 
the course of exposure. The specificity of verbalization appears to play a particularly 
important part. Philippot, Vrielynck and Muller (2010) asked participants to give a 3-
minute videotaped speech on a difficult topic chosen by the experimenters. Prior to the 
speech, the participants were asked a series of questions about their anticipation of giving 
the speech. The questions were designed to foster either a generic or a specific mode of 
processing. Individuals in the generic condition were asked about thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations that they typically experience in similar situations, while those in the specific 
condition were asked to specify as precisely as possible what thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations they experienced in the moment. The results indicated that at the end of the 
speech the participants in the specific processing group experienced less speech anxiety 
compared to the individuals in the generic processing or the control groups when rated by 
the judges or by self-report. 
A different study investigated the effect of specific experiential mode of processing 
vs. an abstract-analytic mode on the emotional valence of thoughts after an impromptu 
speech task (Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 2012). This crossover design study found that 
individuals who initially adopted a specific mode of processing, compared to those who 
initially adopted an abstract-analytic mode of processing, showed fewer negatively 
emotionally valenced thoughts at the end of the first post-intervention assessment. The 
results indicated a successful change of appraisal of emotional stimuli for the experiential 
self-focus group, making the stimuli less negative. There were no differences between the 
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groups at the second post-intervention assessment, after the self-focus tasks were 
switched, suggesting that experiential self-focus was primarily responsible for the 
change. 
These studies taken together suggest that a specific, experiential, "in-the-moment" 
processing of immediate experience can enhance interventions that work with emotion, 
such as exposure, especially when the emotional experience itself is being labelled, 
reappraised, and elaborated on. 
Core emotional processes in Social Anxiety Disorder 
Fear of negative evaluation is thought of as being the core pathogenic feature for 
social anxiety: individuals with social anxiety believe that others are likely to think of 
them critically, and they place special importance on being evaluated in a positive light 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The fear of negative evaluation is triggered by social-
evaluative situations where having an audience is the primary source of threat. However, 
it is critical to notice that the audience does not have to intentionally observe the socially 
anxious individual. For these people, anxiety and fear can be generated simply from the 
possibility that one might be perceived by someone, such as a stranger passing by on the 
street or the idea that someone might see one's picture, videotaped performance, etc. 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Emotional processing theory postulates that the “fear of embarrassment” fear 
structure is underlying social anxiety disorder. In this type of fear structure, the meaning 
of threat is associated with a multitude of social stimuli and contexts (such as public 
speeches, neutral facial expressions). Verbal, physiological and behavioral responses to 
such stimuli (such as sweating, blushing, or avoiding eye contact) are likewise associated 
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with the risk of embarrassment and, in turn, tend to be interpreted as drawing criticism 
and increasing the likelihood of being rejected by others, further increasing the 
individual's anxiety. Fear structure in social anxiety is furthermore associated with high 
estimates of cost and probability of harm in social situations, such as expecting others to 
always be rejecting, or interpreting somewhat negative social events in catastrophic terms 
(Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006). Thus, fear of embarrassment is the treatment target 
according to emotional processing theory in this context. 
There is another contender for the role of the core pathogenic feature of social 
anxiety. Maladaptive shame is a social emotion characterized by a sense of self as flawed. 
Thus, maladaptive shame involves a global negative self-evaluation of oneself as being 
unacceptable in some interpersonal context (whether real or imagined) and is associated 
with a tendency to withdraw or hide (Lewis, 1971). Being prone to shame and the 
subsequent dysfunctional methods of coping with shame have been established as having 
a relationship with severity of psychopathology across multiple studies, and have been 
proposed as important mechanisms of disorder in depression and eating disorders 
(Candea & Szentagotai, 2013). Hedman, Ström, Stünkel, and Mörtberg (2013) found that 
individuals with social anxiety disorder, when compared to a control group of healthy 
participants matched on age and gender, showed more pronounced experiences of shame.  
It is important to note that while maladaptive fear and shame are subjectively 
experienced in different ways, they are related. Both emotions are associated with a 
negative core sense of self and tendencies to withdraw or collapse rather than engage in 
any adaptive action tendency (Pascual-Leone & Greenberg, 2007). Thus, it is not 
surprising they both are prominently featured in social anxiety disorder. 
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In contrast to emotional processing theory, the theory based on emotion focused 
therapy (Shahar, 2013) states that the primary pathogenic feature in social anxiety 
disorder is shame-anxiety, a complex emotion which consists of maladaptive shame 
related to the negative core sense of self, with anxiety playing only a secondary role. This 
theory argues that primary emotions are fundamental reactions to an immediate situation 
or cue, while secondary emotions are reactions to primary emotions or cognitions, and 
therefore less central as a treatment target. According to this model of social anxiety, the 
secondary fear is about the risk of primary shame about being fundamentally flawed and 
unacceptable. Therefore, from the emotion-focused therapy treatment perspective, a 
successful treatment of social anxiety is predicated on activating and transforming the 
shame-based structure first and foremost, rather than changing anxiety and the associated 
fear structure (Shahar, 2013). Coming from a different treatment perspective, Fergus et 
al. (2010) found that during the course of exposure treatment a reduction in shame-
proneness was related to changes in social anxiety disorder symptoms, further supporting 
the role of maladaptive shame as a core psychopathologic process. This critical role of 
shame supports the idea that that a successful treatment of social anxiety through 
exposure may not only require a change in the “fear structure,” but more importantly a 
change in the “shame structure.” 
Summary of Key Issues and Presenting Research questions 
The literature reviewed above indicates the central role of emotions during exposure 
to feared situations. The first line of evidence points out that verbal processing of 
emotions appears to influence emotion regulation efforts in some way. Explicit verbal 
labelling of emotions, in particular, has been found to down-regulate the implicit 
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physiological and behavioral reactions to threatening stimuli. The specificity and detail 
with which one verbalizes negative aspects of emotional experience has also been shown 
to reduce negative affect. Investigating this line of evidence further has important 
implications for exposure interventions, and potentially for other psychotherapy 
interventions as well. 
The second line of evidence indicates that exposure treatments have a documented 
history of success, but certain emotional processes may be more important than others 
when it comes to determining the outcomes of exposure to feared situations. Habituation 
of fear has long been considered to be central to the therapeutic effects of exposure, 
which is in line with emotional processing theory. However, recent evidence points 
towards an inconsistent association between this habituation as an emotional process and 
change over the course of exposure, and instead points towards variability in the intensity 
of emotional states as the central therapeutic factor, which is more in line with inhibitory 
learning theory. Investigating these two emotional processes (i.e., habituation to emotion 
vs. variability in the intensity of emotion) as predictors of outcomes would be important 
in contributing to the evidence base of one theory over another. 
The third line of evidence points towards the existence of a common inhibitory neural 
network involved in the regulation of all emotional states, including fear and shame. This 
network includes the amygdala-vACC-vmPFC neural circuit. Without the use of 
neuroimaging, the inhibitory activity of this neural circuit can only be inferred from the 
measurement of heart rate variability. However, such physiological measurement may 
shed further light on physiological correlates of implicit emotional processes, such as 
habituation and the variability in the intensity of emotional states. 
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A fourth line of evidence has to do with which emotion is central to exposure 
interventions. An emotion of fear has been considered central to exposure so far, 
although the emerging evidence indicates that other emotions have a role to play as well. 
In social anxiety disorder specifically, fear of embarrassment may be on par, or even 
secondary to, shame. It is important to understand whether that is the case to help guide 
future exposure research and interventions for social anxiety. 
The current study 
The present study aimed to investigate these lines of inquiry by recruiting university 
students with fear of public speaking to participate in an experimental design study. As 
part of the study, the participants were asked to come up with and deliver a videotaped 
speech on the topic of their choosing, with the understanding that the speech will later be 
evaluated by two expert raters. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups. The participants in the control group were asked to engage in a distraction word 
puzzle task. The participants in the exposure group were asked to watch their videotape 
for a total of three times while paying close attention to the video, although they were not 
informed of how many times they were to watch the recording. Finally, the participants in 
the experiential group were given the same instructions as the participants in the exposure 
group, except that after watching the video the participants were asked by the 
experimenter to verbally label and elaborate on their emotional experience. After the 
experimental manipulation (which comprised control, exposure, or experiential task) the 
participants were asked to come up with and deliver a second speech in the same way as 
before, except that it had to be on a different topic. The participants were not informed of 
the second speech to avoid the anticipation effects. The participants in all groups were 
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asked to fill out a series of measures before, after, and sometimes during the experimental 
task. The measures before and after the experimental task were aiming to assess 
behavioral and emotional changes, while the measures during the experimental task were 
aiming to measure emotional processes related to experiences of fear and shame, as well 
as indices of physiological activity. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were proposed by the study: (H1) there are greater 
behavioral and emotional changes in the experiential group, as compared to exposure 
group, or to the control group. It was predicted that the participants in the experiential 
group would have the most improvement in quality of their speech performance and state 
self-esteem, followed by the exposure group, followed by the control group. This 
hypothesis was examined through a comparison of change in measures from before the 
experimental task to after the experimental task while taking group membership into 
account. Additionally, (H2) process variables (i.e. initial activation, habituation and 
variability) related to fear and shame are predictive of change on the outcome measures. 
No specific predictions were made as to which emotional processes are more predictive 
of change given the mixed evidence to date. However, it was predicted that, irrespective 
of intervention, processes related to shame would be more predictive of the change in 
speech performance and state self-esteem outcome measures than experience of fear. 
These hypotheses were examined through the process component of the design. Finally, 
(H3) physiological indices of arousal are predictive of change on the outcome measures 
as well. It was predicted that higher heart rate variability during the task would predict 
better speech performance and state self-esteem at the conclusion of the study. No 
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specific prediction was made in regards to the high frequency component of measured 
heart rate variability, but it was expected that it would correlate with emotional process 
measures (i.e. both habituation, and variability in the intensity, of emotional states). 
Methods 
Sample 
Participants were recruited from the Psychology Participant Pool at the University of 
Windsor, Ontario, and were awarded credit for their participation in accordance with the 
Participant Pool policy. Participants were recruited from the Undergraduate Participant 
Pool in two stages. During the first stage, to be eligible for the study, the participants had 
to answer “yes” to two screening questions: "Are you anxious in social situations?", and 
"Are you afraid of speaking in front of an audience?" Those participants who qualified 
could enter the online screening part of the study, where they were asked to fill out a 
basic demographics questionnaire as well as social anxiety screening measure. Those 
participants who fit the inclusion criteria were asked to come on campus to participate in 
the main part of the study in person. 
To be included in the study, the participants had to satisfy the following criteria: (1) 
answer "yes" to both screening questions, as discussed above; (2) score at or above the 
cut-off scores on the Social Anxiety Disorder screening measures; and (3) not meet any 
of the exclusion criteria. As suggested by Antony and Swinson (2002), if a participant 
reported that he or she met the following criteria, he or she was excluded from the on-site 
study: (a) cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, severe asthma or other respiratory 
disorder, hyperthyroidism or other respiratory disorder, or epilepsy; (b) current use of 
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benzodiazepines or beta-blocker medication; (c) excessive use of cannabis or alcohol in 
the past 30 days; (d) presence of suicidal ideation or self-harm in the past 30 days. 
The study screened 318 participants online, and of those, 106 did not meet the cut-
off criteria for social anxiety measures, and further 51 did not meet one or more of the 
other screening criteria (see Appendix E). The remaining 161 participants who met study 
criteria were contacted individually by email, and 45 of them came for the on-site study. 
Out of those who met in person, 4 individuals chose not to complete the study. All 
individuals who withdrew from the study chose to do so before or during the first speech 
task, which was part of the experimental protocol. The final sample consisted of 41 
individuals, with an average age of 20.9 years (SD = 3.9), with 87.8% (n = 36) of 
participants female. In addition, 31.7% (n = 13) of the sample met diagnostic criteria for 
Social Anxiety Disorder based on the DSM-V criteria, as determined by a semi-
structured interview at the beginning of the on-site visit. See Appendix F for additional 
demographic information. 
Procedure 
The participants who qualified during the screening part of the study were invited for 
the on-site study which lasted approximately 60 minutes on average, and that took place 
on campus in a laboratory room, one participant at a time (see Figure 1 for a full design 
graph). Upon arrival, each participant was greeted by the experimenter and walked 
through the informed consent process and then randomly assigned to one of the three 
experimental groups. Irrespective of group assignment, after the consent forms were 
signed, audio recorder was turned on and recorded throughout the experimental session. 
The experimenter then took each participant to a separate room where the participant was 
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instructed on how to put on the heart rate chest strap, and then given time to change in 
privacy. After that, a 5-minute baseline period was recorded for the heart rate with the 
instruction to put away electronic devices and sit still while the experimenter stepped out 
of the room. Following that, the experimenter returned and asked the participant a series 
of questions from the semi-structured Social Anxiety Disorder interview. 
The experimental procedure commenced and the participant was given the 
instructions for their first speech (Step 1) by the experimenter. Prior to and right after 
Step 1 the participant was asked to give a fear (SUDS) rating indicating how anxious he 
or she felt on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most anxious they have ever been). This 
procedure served as a manipulation check and aimed to establish whether the 
experimental procedures affected participant’s anxiety. Following that, the participant 
was given a series of outcome questionnaires to fill out (Step 2). After the participant was 
finished with the questionnaires, Step 3 commenced. The experimenter told the 
participant that he or she would have 3 minutes to come up with a speech topic while the 
experimenter stepped out of the room. When the experimenter returned, the participant 
was given 3 minutes to deliver the speech in front of the video camera and the 
experimenter. 
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Figure 1. The experimental design. 
 
After the participant delivered the speech, Step 4 commenced, which was the first 
step in the experiment where individuals received group-specific set of instructions for 
the task (see Appendix A for detailed instructions). There were three experimental groups 
in the protocol: control group, exposure group, and experiential group. Participants in all 
three groups followed the same general procedure: participants were given a group-
specific set of instructions (Step 4a), after which they were asked to give their fear and 
shame ratings before the experimental task (Step 4b), after which they engaged in the 
group-specific experimental task (Step 4c), after which they were asked to give fear and 
shame ratings again (Step 4d). Participants in the control group were asked to solve a list 
of anagrams during the Step 4c. Participants in the exposure group were asked to watch 
the video of themselves giving the speech with the instruction to pay close attention. 
Participants in the experiential group were also asked to watch the video of themselves 
giving the speech and pay attention, and in addition to that after the video the participants 
were asked to verbally label and elaborate on emotions they experienced while watching 
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themselves on the recording (see Appendix A for detailed instructions participants 
received). This procedure (Steps 4a to 4d) was repeated a total of three times for each 
participant, and the participants were not informed of how many times they were to 
engage in the experimental task. 
After completing the experimental task (Step 4), the participants in all groups 
received the same instructions for the remainder of the study. The participant was given 
instructions for their second speech (Step 5), and then asked to give a fear rating again. It 
is important to note that the participants were not informed that there was a second 
speech at any point in the study to avoid effects of anticipation. If a participant asked a 
question regarding upcoming procedures in the study, the experimenter told them that he 
cannot answer that question, but also noted that the study would be finished in the 
allotted amount of time and reminded the participant that they could end the study at any 
time without receiving penalty. 
After the participant received the instruction regarding the second speech, he or she 
was asked to fill out the outcome questionnaires (Step 6), and prepare and deliver their 
second speech in the same way as before (Step 7), with a clarification that the second 
speech should be on a different topic than the first speech. Participants were then asked 
whether they wanted a debriefing on the study or wanted to ask any questions, and given 
a chance to do so. 
The speech tasks. Speech videotaping procedures were modeled after the behavioral 
assessment tests (BATs), which are commonly used in social anxiety research and 
provide a semi-structured opportunity for observational evaluation of the participant's 
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quality of social performance, visibility of anxiety symptoms, as well as avoidance and 
escape behaviors (Hart, Jack, Turk, & Heimberg, 1999). In this paradigm, participants are 
often asked to confront a feared situation in a controlled environment, such as giving an 
impromptu videotaped speech in front of a small audience of confederates (Beidel, 
Turner, Jacob, & Cooley, 1989). In the proposed study participants were asked to give 
two 3-minute speeches in front of a video camera on the topic of their choosing. In prior 
research, physiological, cognitive, and behavioral data collected during the speech task 
was generally shown to have high test-retest reliability (Beidel et al., 1989), as well as 
sensitivity to the pre-to-post effects of treatment (Heimberg et al., 1990; Turner, Beidel, 
Cooley, Woody, & Messer, 1994). Thus, the speech task offers a flexible, semi-structured 
paradigm for subsequent measurements to be used.  
Ethical considerations. 
To address any concern about the safety of an exposure-based task, despite strong 
evidence that exposure interventions are generally as safe as other validated 
psychological interventions for the treatment of anxiety disorders, this study followed the 
guidelines suggested by Olatunji, Deacon, and Abramowitz (2009), and by Antony and 
Swinson (2002). To that end, the participants were informed of potential side-effects and 
benefits of challenging oneself with difficult emotional experiences, and reminded that 
they reserve the right to terminate the procedure at any time throughout the course of the 
session. Participants were also informed that if they find themselves feeling too 
uncomfortable, they can stop at any time. 
Measures 
Intervention outcome measures. 
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale-6 (SIAS-6) and Social Phobia Scale-6 (SPS-6). 
The SIAS/SPS-6 (Peters, Sunderland, Andrews, Rapee, & Mattick, 2012) is an adaptation 
of the widely used Social Interaction and Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale 
(SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998), designed to provide a short screening and psychotherapy 
outcome tool for evaluating social anxiety. The SPS scale focuses on the assessment of 
fear of negative evaluation during routine activities, such as eating when others are 
present, while the SIAS focuses on fears of social interaction. The brief versions (of six 
items) used in this study correlated highly with the original versions (r's = .88 - .94) at 
pre-, post-treatment, and 3-month follow-up, and showed convergent and discriminant 
validity. Both SIAS-6 and SPS-6 showed high diagnostic sensitivity (84.86 - 87.97) and 
specificity (86.05 - 97.67) in distinguishing individuals with social phobia from those 
without. Peters et al. (2012) suggested the following cut-offs for the presence of social 
anxiety disorder: a score of 7 or higher on SIAS-6, and a score of 2 or higher on SPS-6. 
While the short versions of these scales have not been used in single-session intervention 
studies as of yet, the full versions of SIAS and a shortened version of SPS were used as 
the screening measures in an experimental single-intervention study by Nilsson et al. 
(2012).  
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale-Straightforward items (BFNE-S). The 
BFNE-S (Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005) is an adaptation of Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation Scale (BNFE; Leary, 1983), which itself is an adaptation of the 
original Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), a measure designed 
to assess the degree of fear of negative evaluation that is thought to be critical to the 
maintenance of social anxiety disorder. BFNE-S was found to have excellent internal 
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consistency (α = .90 - .96), convergent validity with other measures of social anxiety, and 
discriminant validity with measures of mood. BFNE-S was found to have superior 
psychometric characteristics compared to BFNE-II (Carleton et al., 2007) and equivalent 
to BFNE-R (Carleton et al., 2006). It has been recommended over BFNE-R for a smaller 
gender difference in scoring (Carleton, Collimore, McCabe, & Antony, 2011). 
Brief Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker (BPRCS). The BPRCS (Hook, 
Smith, & Valentiner, 2008) is a 12-item adaptation of the 30-item Personal Report of 
Confidence as a Speaker (PRCS; Paul, 1966), and is a measure of fear of public speaking. 
BPRCS was found to have good internal consistency (α = .85), good convergent validity 
with other measures of anxiety, and divergent validity with measure of depressed mood 
and sociability. 
State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). The SSES (Heartherton & Polivy, 1991) is a 
commonly used 20-item measure of self-esteem that is designed to capture 
experimentally-induced temporary deviations from a more global, stable view of one's 
self due to laboratory manipulations (Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). The SSES has a 
correlated 3 factor structure of performance, social and appearance self-esteem. The 
measure was found to have good internal consistency, α = .92, as well as discriminant 
and construct validity (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Additionally, the SSES can 
successfully distinguish changes in mood from changes in state self-esteem (Bagozzi & 
Heatherton, 1994). 
Social Performance Rating Scale, Modified (SPRS-M). The SPRS-M (Harb, Eng, 
Zaider, & Heimberg, 2003) is a standardized observer-rated measure of performance on a 
behavioral assessment test (described above) adapted from the Social Performance Rating 
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Scale (SPRS; Fydrich, Chambless, Perry, Buergener, & Beazley, 1998). The SPRS-M 
rates behavioral performance on four dimensions: gaze, voice quality, level of 
discomfort, and conversation flow. This modified version of the scale showed convergent 
and divergent validity with criterion measures of social anxiety (Harb et al., 2003).  
For the purposes of this study, the measure was further modified to more closely 
correspond to the task the participants were asked to engage in, and to improve the 
reliability between the raters. A total of 82 videos (for 41 participants) were assigned a 
randomly generated 5-digit code, such that the raters could not infer which condition any 
given participant was in, or whether the speech was before or after the experimental task. 
Process measures. 
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS). The SUDS (Wolpe, 1958) is one of the 
most widely-used measures of anxiety to specific stimuli (Tanner, 2012). SUDS has the 
range of values from 0-100, although various ranges are used in practice (Antony & 
Swinson, 2002). SUDS was found to be a valid measure of both physical and emotional 
global discomfort (Tanner, 2012), and has been used as a measure of activation of fear 
structure (Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
To test the effect of emotional processes on outcomes, this study used predictors 
suggested by Kircanski et al. (2012): (1) Initial fear activation, operationalized as the 
highest SUDS score during the experimental task; (2) Within session habituation, 
operationalized as the difference between the peak SUDS score and the final SUDS score 
at the end of the experimental task; (3) Variance in emotional process, operationalized as 
the standard deviation of SUDS during the experimental task. These variables were 
computed based on a total of six data points prior to and right after each iteration of the 
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experimental task, so as not to interfere with the experimental task itself (see Figure 1, 
steps 4b and 4d).  
Like Culver et al. (2012), this study uses the term habituation to stay consistent with 
the terminology used in emotion processing theory and exposure literature in general, 
although the term here applies to the observation of attenuation in levels of fear over time 
rather than a hypothesized mechanism of change. 
State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS). The SSGS (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 
1994) is a 15 item, 3 subscale measure that evaluates the experience of shame, guilt, and 
pride as they occur in the moment (e.g. "I want to sink into the floor and disappear", "I 
feel small"). Only the Shame subscale will be used for this study. The Shame subscale 
has been demonstrated to have a good internal consistency (α = .82 - .89). 
Due to administrative error, the full SSGS Shame subscale (5 items) was completed 
by approximately half the sample (n = 21 out of 41). The rest of the sample only 
completed two items out of five, and subsequently, these two items were used to compute 
the overall SSGS Shame score
2
. Examining the n = 21 subset, this abbreviated measure 
score correlated with the full scale score at an average of r(20) = .96 (range .94 to .98) 
across six time points, and therefore was deemed an acceptable substitution for the 5-item 
subscale as needed for the purposes of this study. Thus, total SSGS Shame subscale 
scores were computed from only two items for all 41 participants.  
To test the effect of emotional processes on outcomes, process indices related to 
shame were created following the same logic as process indices related to fear: (1) Initial 
                                                          
2
 As indicated above, the inconsistency in participants’ completion of the SSGS was due 
to an administrative error and as such was not a reflection of participant response 
patterns. 
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shame activation, operationalized as the highest SSGS score during the experimental 
task; (2) Within session habituation, operationalized as the difference between the peak 
SSGS score and the final SSGS score at the end of the experimental task; (3) Variance in 
emotional process, operationalized as the standard deviation of SSGS during the 
experimental task. 
It is important to note that the term habituation of shame is used here as a 
convenient shorthand referring to an observation of a reduction in the intensity of shame 
over the course of the experimental task, rather than a hypothesized mechanism of 
change. 
Physiological measures. 
Heart rate was measured using a Polar S810i heart rate monitor which recorded R-R 
intervals for the duration of the study. A 5-minute resting heart rate baseline was assessed 
at the beginning of the study. Depolarization of the heart ventricles during heartbeat can 
be detected via electrocardiogram, and the resulting electrical signal (the R-wave of the 
QRS complex) can be recorded. The time between the two adjacent R-wave peaks (R-R 
intervals) indicates the passage of time between two adjacent heartbeats (Appelhans & 
Leucken, 2006). Because heartbeat in actuality is irregular, the time of R-R intervals 
varies substantially throughout the recording. Some form of measurement of variability in 
the length of the R-R intervals forms the basis of heart rate variability measurement. 
Generally speaking, these approaches fall into the time-domain and frequency-domain 
methods. The latter make use of Fast Fourier Transform to decompose the time signal 
into its constituent wavelengths (Task Force of The European Society of Cardiology and 
The North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996). Regardless of 
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measurement, reduced heart rate variability indicates a cardiovascular system which is 
not adaptable to environmental challenges and is associated with greater incidence of 
cardiovascular disease and mortality (Kemp & Quintana, 2013). 
The current study examined a ratio of low to high frequency components of recorded 
heart rate variability (LF/HF), which is influenced by a combination of sympathetic and 
parasympathetic input, as an index of overall heart rate variability and flexibility in 
emotion regulation (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). High frequency component (HF) of 
heart rate variability was examined as well, because it is mainly influenced by 
parasympathetic input and is thought to be an index of inhibitory activity of the prefrontal 
cortex (Thayer & Lane, 2009). Unlike SUDS and SSGS, which were measured right 
before and right after each iteration of the experimental task, heart rate variability was 
measured continuously during each iteration of the experimental task (see Figure 1, step 
4c). It is important to note that heart rate variability was measured in three 3-minute 
intervals during each iteration of experimental task for any given experimental group. 
Such a short time interval for heart rate variability recording places a limitation on the 
accuracy and reliability of physiological findings. 
Analysis 
Results were analyzed using multilevel regression after Meuret et al. (2012) study 
which suggested this approach to analyzing similar type of data
3
. One of the key 
advantages of using multilevel regression is that it allows a way to model data change 
over time while simultaneously examining an experimental design as a multilevel data 
                                                          
3
 An alternative approach using multiple regression (after Culver et al., 2012; Kirkanski et 
al., 2012) was also tried and produced very similar results. 
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structure so that experimental manipulation can be studied simultaneously with individual 
differences (Cohen et al., 2003). In this particular study, multilevel regression allowed a 
flexible approach to examining change across experimental interventions while 
simultaneously taking into account experimental group membership as well as dynamic 
changes within different emotional processes during the intervention. An additional 
advantage of this approach was that it allowed examining nested patterns of data 
simultaneously. 
Full Maximum Likelihood (FML) procedure was used for all analyses, since it 
allows a direct comparison of both fixed and random effects of nested models (Hox, 
2010). Robust error estimates of fixed effects are reported throughout. The statistical 
analysis strategy consisted of four steps. At each new step of regression a χ2 deviance test 
was conducted to assess whether each new step results in a better fit of regression model 
to the data, and if the fit at any given step was not improved, no further steps in the 
analysis were taken. Step 1, the intercept only model, assessed the degree of intra-class 
correlation in the data. Step 2, the random intercept and fixed slope model with Time as 
level-1 predictor, assessed whether there was any overall change pre-to-post on a given 
measure for the individuals, and if this step failed to find significant change over time, no 
further analysis was conducted. Step 3 used level-2 predictors (group membership and 
process variables) to examine which variables influenced change over time on any given 
variable. Step 4 added random slopes to the model to test whether contextual variables 
exerted different effects on change pre-to-post for different individuals, i.e. whether the 
individuals’ slopes varied significantly around the average slope. Random slopes were 
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modeled during the last step, since Hox (2010) suggested that the fixed effects model 
should have a good fit before the random effects are introduced.  
Pre and post observations were entered at level 1 (n = 82), and were nested within 
individuals at level-2 (n = 41). Because HLM7 software does not automatically produce 
beta-weights, they were calculated from unstandardized coefficients using the formula β 
= B * SDpredictor / SDoutcome (SSI Central, n.d.). All continuous predictors were centered 
around their respective grand means. 
Assumptions Testing 
The data were first explored using histograms and boxplots to determine presence 
of unusual cases. Model assumptions were checked for violations by examining model 
residuals at both levels for the intercept-only model, as well as the final model for each 
outcome variable. Normality of residuals was evaluated through Q-Q plots at both levels. 
Homoscedasticity was evaluated by a formal chi-squared test provided by the HLM7 
software at level 1, and by plotting residuals against their predicted scores at both levels. 
Linearity was assessed by plotting the residuals against the predictor variables and 
superimposing a lowess fit line (Cohen et al., 2003). Presence of multicollinearity was 
tested by examining the Multilevel Variance Inflation Factor scores using the inverse of 
the predictor correlation matrix (Clark, 2013). 
Results 
Inter-rater reliability for speech performance (SPRS-M) 
Two raters who were blind to the conditions (the experimenter and an 
undergraduate research assistant) each coded 100% of the videos using the SPRS-M 
scale. The raters underwent approximately three hours of training over the course of two 
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days on three-minute YouTube videos before rating the experimental videos. Inter-rater 
agreement was assessed using the intra-class correlation (ICC), which was computed in 
SPSS (two-way random, absolute agreement) following suggestions of Landers (2015). 
Inter-rater agreement for the videos was high, ICC (2, 2) = .953. After reliability was 
calculated, all disagreements were resolved by discussion that led to consensus between 
the raters. These minor changes produced a higher caliber data set that was then 
submitted for the analyses that follow.  
Manipulation checks 
A paired-samples t-test indicated that the instruction before the first speech task 
exerted the desired experimental effect, significantly raising the levels of self-reported 
fear from an average of 46.4 to 59.2 points on the SUDS scale, t(40) = 8.016, p < .001. In 
addition to that, the average levels of both self-reported fear and shame during the 
experimental task were not significantly different among the three groups, F(2, 38) = 
.253, p = .778, for fear,  and F(2, 38) = .404, p = .671, for shame, respectively. These 
results suggest that the participants in the active control group were under approximately 
the same amount of stress while solving word puzzles as the participants who watched 
themselves on the videotape, despite being told they will not be evaluated on the task. 
Assumptions 
No pronounced violations of assumptions were detected. The model residuals 
appeared to be normally distributed on both levels, variances met the homoscedasticity 
requirement, and the relationship between the predictor variables and outcomes appeared 
to be linear. One anomaly, however, was found in the analysis: Within session 
habituation of fear was highly correlated with variability in fear levels (SUDS; r = .92, p 
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< .001). A similar high correlation was observed in relation to habituation and variability 
in shame (SSGS; r = .76, p < .001), although habituation of shame and variability in 
shame were less highly related than for fear.  
These relationships between the predictors introduced a significant degree of 
multicollinearity in the model (see Table 1). It is important to note that multicollinearity 
does not violate any assumptions of the regression (Voss, 2004), but it does result in a 
number of complications. It is known to produce unstable (or context-specific) parameter 
coefficients with wide standard errors, leading to attenuated power in multiple regression 
(Cohen et al., 2003).  Multilevel regression appears to suffer from the same problems, so 
that even relatively large regression coefficients run the risk of being found non-
significant under substantial multicollinearity (Clark, 2013). While severe 
multicollinearity makes interpretation of individual coefficients difficult, it does not 
affect joint influence of the predictors when tested simultaneously (Cohen et al., 2003). 
Moreover, common remedies for collinearity such as dropping one of the correlated 
predictors or using the principal components regression create their own difficulties in 
interpretation (Voss, 2004). The only remedy chosen in this situation was centering the 
predictors.  
Table 1 
Multilevel variance inflation factor (MVIF) values of 
emotional process predictors. 
  
  
MVIF 
Predictor SUDS SSGS 
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Initial activation 1.194 2.544 
Variability 7.612 3.842 
Within session habituation 7.796 2.334 
Note. SUDS = Subjective units of distress scale; SSGS = 
State shame and guilt scale (shame subscale). 
 
A closer inspection of the highly correlated predictors revealed that when they were 
entered into the model separately, they were not significant, but the significance changed 
drastically when they were entered together. An inspection of zero-order and partial 
correlations revealed the presence of statistical suppression both when fear process 
predictors were used (see Table 2) and when shame process predictors were used (see 
Table 3). Note that in both tables process variables are positively correlated with each 
other while also correlating with the outcome in opposite directions. In addition to that, 
note the change in the magnitude of effect when one process variable is correlated with 
the outcome while being controlled for the other process variable. Both of these signs are 
tell-tale marks of statistical suppression (Paulhus et al., 2004). 
Statistical suppression occurs when the relationship between two predictor variables 
hides their true relationships with the outcome variable (Cohen et al., 2003). Likewise, 
Paulhus et al. (2004) suggest that when the relationship between the predictor variables 
results in a “suppression situation,” the indirect effects of variables are so strong that they 
overwhelm the direct effects. Paulhus et al. (2004) give an intuitive example of where 
one finds statistical suppression, involving the constructs of self-esteem and narcissism, 
two variables which positively correlate with each other. However, because their measure 
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of self-esteem inadvertently also measured narcissism, it was thus “contaminated” by it. 
This produced the puzzling net effect that self-esteem appeared to have slight positive, 
negative, and null correlations with antisocial behaviour across three samples. When self-
esteem and narcissism were entered into regression jointly, their true relationship with 
antisocial behaviour was revealed: self-esteem had a strong negative correlation with 
antisocial behaviour, while narcissism had a strong positive correlation across all three 
samples – despite the fact that the variables were positively correlated with one another. 
More informative direct effects, given suppression, can only be revealed if the indirect 
path is controlled for. This can be accomplished by removing the shared variance 
between the predictors so that they do not “contaminate” each other by entering both 
predictors in the regression model as a block. The implications of this for interpreting the 
findings are further explored in the discussion section. 
Table 2 
 Full and partial correlations between fear processes and speech performance 
 
Speech performance 
Fear Habituation -0.12 
Fear Habituation † -0.38* 
Fear Variability 0.02 
Fear Variability ‡ 0.36* 
  
 
Fear Habituation 
Fear Variability 0.93** 
Note. SPRS-M = Social performance rating scale-modified; SUDS = Subjective 
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units of distress scale; * p < .05; ** p < .01; † controlled for variability; ‡ 
controlled for habituation. Note that fear process variables are positively 
correlated with each other but correlate in opposite directions with speech 
performance. 
 
Table 3 
 Full and partial correlations between shame processes and state self-esteem 
 
State self-esteem 
Shame Habituation 0.06 
Shame Habituation† 0.35* 
Shame Variability -0.21 
Shame Variability‡ -0.40* 
  
 
Shame Habituation 
ShameVariability 0.76** 
Note. SSES = State self-esteem scale; SSGS = State shame and guilt scale 
(shame subscale); * p < .05; ** p < .01; † controlled for variability; ‡ controlled 
for habituation. Note that shame process variables are positively correlated with 
each other but correlate in opposite directions with state self-esteem. 
Main Analyses 
The analysis failed to find any changes from before the experimental task to after 
the task on either Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation-Straightforward items (BFNE-S) or 
Brief Personal Record of Confidence as Speaker (BPRCS) measures, so no further 
analyses were carried out on them. The same analyses were conducted for the Social 
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Performance Rating Scale – Modified (SPRS-M) and State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES). 
The results indicated that the latter two measures showed significant change from before 
the experimental task to after the task, and this change was examined further. Findings 
related to each of these two latter outcome measures are presented in respective sections 
below. Correlations between outcome measures are presented in Appendix D, while 
respective means and standard deviations can be found in Appendix G. 
Testing hypothesis 1: Do verbal processes affect outcomes? 
Experimental group predicts somewhat better speech performance (SPRS-M). 
Initial steps of the analysis indicated a significant change over time in speech 
performance. These were followed up with an analysis that simultaneously introduced 
two orthogonal contrasts. Contrast A compared the two active groups vs. the control 
group, while Contrast B specifically compared the experiential group vs. the exposure 
group. As expected, no significant group differences were found on their baseline speech 
performance, indicating that the random assignment into the groups worked as intended. 
Contrast A found that experiential and exposure groups taken together improved their 
speech performance to a greater degree, β = .15, t(38) = 2.01, p = .052, when compared to 
the Control group. These results indicate that processing the experience during the speech 
in some way made a difference over not processing that experience and using distraction 
instead. Even so, this difference was only marginally statistically significant, and the 
effect size was small. At the same time, contrast B indicated that the experiential group 
improved speech performance to a greater degree as compared to the exposure group, β = 
.16, t(38) = 2.04, p = .048, with a small effect size as well. These results indicate that 
verbally elaborating on the experience during the speech was more effective than simply 
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observing the videotape without explicitly talking about the experience. While these 
contrasts were each statistically significant individually (or were close to being 
significant), regression which included this set of contrasts did not pass the deviance test, 
χ2(4) = 7.49, p =.111, indicating that regression as a whole did not become more accurate 
when these two contrasts were included as compared to regression which did not take 
these contrasts into account. Thus, group membership offered an overall weak 
explanation of change in speech performance. 
An additional post hoc analysis was also carried out to test whether diagnosable 
social anxiety affected the results of the previous analysis. This additional analysis 
indicated that having diagnosable social anxiety improved the accuracy of regression, 
χ2(2) = 6.84, p = .032, and indicated that participants with diagnosable social anxiety had 
worse first speech performance compared to rest of the sample, β = -.38, t(37) = -2.83, p 
= .007. Inclusion of this predictor rendered both orthogonal contrasts discussed above 
statistically non-significant, but otherwise did not change the interpretation of the results.  
Experimental group does not predict state self-esteem (SSES).  
The analysis found no effect of experimental group on SSES prior to the 
experimental task or over time. This indicates that the random assignment was successful 
and all three groups had the same level of state self-esteem prior to the experimental task. 
Moreover, subsequent change in state self-esteem from before to after the experimental 
task was unrelated to which group the individuals were assigned to. All further analyses 
involving fear and shame processes were carried out on the whole dataset irrespective of 
group assignment because, as mentioned before, participants did not differ in the levels of 
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fear and shame they experienced during the experimental task based on their group 
membership, including the control group. 
An additional post hoc analysis was also carried out to test whether diagnosable 
social anxiety affected the results of the previous analysis. This additional analysis 
indicated that having diagnosable social anxiety improved the accuracy of regression, 
χ2(2) = 15.76, p < .001, and indicated that participants with diagnosable social anxiety 
had worse state self-esteem at the onset of the study compared to rest of the sample, β = -
.57, t(37) = -5.25, p < .001. Inclusion of this predictor did not markedly change beta-
weights, significance levels, or the interpretation of the results related to other predictors.  
Hypothesis 1 results summary. 
Overall, it appears that Hypothesis 1 was only weakly substantiated. There was 
evidence to indicate that exposure together with verbal labelling and elaborating on 
emotional experience may result in a slight improvement in speech performance when 
compared to exposure alone, but there was no evidence to indicate that such verbal 
processing influenced changes in state self-esteem. 
Testing hypothesis 2: Do emotional processes predict outcomes? 
Strategy for analysis of emotional processes. 
Because the effects of experimental manipulation were ambiguous, and because the 
participants in the control group experienced the same amount of fear and shame during 
the word puzzle solving task as the other two groups did during the experimental 
interventions, all further analyses involving fear and shame processes were carried out on 
the whole dataset irrespective of group assignment. This analysis strategy was pursued to 
both examine the emotional processes themselves and their effects more closely and to 
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preserve statistical power. Means and standard deviations for emotional processes can be 
found in Appendix H for fear, and appendix I for shame. 
Ratings of distress (SUDS) predict speech performance (SPRS-M).  
Worse speech performance during the first speech was associated with greater 
initial fear activation during the experimental task, β = -.45, t(37) = -3.22, p = .003. These 
results indicate that individuals who did not perform well during the first speech were 
unsettled by their poor performance at the beginning of the experimental task. As 
mentioned earlier, there was an overall improvement in speech performance from before 
the experimental task to after the task, β = .15, t(37) = 3.98, p < .001, likely because of 
practice effects, and the following process predictors should be interpreted in the context 
of this overall improvement. Greater within session habituation of fear during the 
experimental task inhibited or reversed the prediction of improvement in speech 
performance, β = -.63, t(37) = -3.54, p = .001 (see Figure 2), suggesting that becoming 
more at ease during the task was detrimental for subsequent performance. Greater initial 
fear activation was related to improvement in speech performance from before the 
experimental task to after the task, β = .16, t(37) = 2.13, p = .040, and so was greater 
variability in fear during the experimental task, β = .54, t(37) = 2.82, p = .008 (see Figure 
3), suggesting that individuals who felt unsettled at the beginning of the experimental 
task and who experienced more pronounced highs and lows of anxiety tended to deliver a 
better next speech, possibly due to experiencing the optimal amount of subjective anxiety 
that was mobilizing, rather than hindering. Further analysis found that including random 
slopes into the model did not improve the model fit.  
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An additional post hoc analysis was also carried out to test whether diagnosable 
social anxiety affected the results of the previous analysis. This additional analysis 
indicated that having diagnosable social anxiety correlated  highly with initial fear 
activation, r(39) = .41, p = .006, but diagnosable social anxiety as a predictor did not 
improve the accuracy of regression, χ2(2) = 3.44, p = .177, and did not change the 
interpretation of the results. 
In summary, an average participant improved his or her speech performance due to 
practice. The participants who performed poorly during the first speech were likely 
unsettled by the quality of their performance at the beginning of the experimental task, 
resulting in heightened anxiety. This initial anxiety appeared to benefit them as these 
participants tended to subsequently improve their performance. In fact, becoming less 
anxious and more at ease during the experimental task was detrimental to the subsequent 
speech performance, and may have reflected some participants’ disengagement or 
boredom. The participants who experienced a greater range of anxiety responses, from 
weak to strong, during the experimental task tended to improve their subsequent speech 
performance the most. 
Given the presence of statistical suppression, as discussed earlier, these results 
should be interpreted with extra caution. Because within session habituation and variance 
in fear levels create statistical suppression, their regression coefficients must be 
interpreted to mean, e.g., an effect of within session habituation of fear on speech 
performance, but only when controlled for variance in fear levels. Likewise, these results 
indicate an effect of variance in fear, but only when controlled for within session 
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habituation. Since initial fear activation was not involved in statistical suppression, its 
coefficient can be interpreted as usual. 
Ratings of anxiety (SUDS) do not predict state self-esteem (SSES). Lower state 
self-esteem prior to experimental task was associated with greater initial fear activation at 
the onset of the experimental task, β = -.58, t(37) = -2.41, p < .001. No other fear process 
variables (i.e., within session habituation and variability in fear levels) were predictive of 
state self-esteem change from before the experimental task to after the task. These results 
indicate that individuals who had lower self-confidence prior to the experimental task 
were unsettled more easily at the onset of the task compared to the individuals who had 
higher self-confidence. 
Ratings of shame (SSGS) do not predict speech performance (SPRS-M). Worse 
performance during the first speech was associated with a greater initial shame activation 
during the subsequent experimental task, β = -.53, t(37) = -2.44, p = .021. Within session 
habituation of shame and variability in shame were not predictive of change in 
performance from the first to the second speech. Further analysis found that including 
random slopes did not improve the model fit. No other processes related to shame 
emerged as good predictors of change in speech performance from first to second speech. 
These results indicate that individuals who did not perform well during the first speech 
were likely aware of their poor performance and were embarrassed by the quality of their 
performance at the onset of the experimental task.  
Ratings of shame (SSGS) predict state self-esteem (SSES). Lower state self-esteem 
prior to the experimental task was associated with greater initial shame activation during 
the experimental task, β = -.43, t(37) = -2.06, p = .047. These results indicate that having 
 44 
 
 
lower self-confidence led to being more easily embarrassed at the beginning of the 
experimental task. There was an overall worsening in state self-esteem from before the 
experimental task to after the task, β = -.18, t(37) = -4.11, p < .001, suggesting that the 
task may have served as a “reality check” for a number of individuals, resulting in an 
overall drop in self-confidence. The following predictors should be interpreted in the 
context this overall decrease. Higher within session habituation of shame served a 
protective function, slowing and potentially reversing any decreases in state self-esteem 
from before to after the task, β =.31, t(37) = 2.77, p = .009 (see Figure 4). However at the 
same time, higher variability in shame predicted further worsening of state self-esteem 
from before to after the experimental task, β = -.35, t(37) = -2.16, p = .038 (see Figure 5). 
In this sense, habituation of shame can be thought of as “protecting” or “buffering” 
against the detrimental effect of initial shame activation and variability in shame. Further 
analysis found that including random slopes did not improve the model fit. 
An additional post hoc analysis was carried out to test whether diagnosable social 
anxiety influenced the results of the previous analysis. Diagnosable social anxiety did not 
significantly correlate with initial shame activation, r(39) = .25, p = .107. Including 
diagnosable social anxiety as a predictor improved the model fit, χ2(2) = 14.63, p = .001, 
and rendered predictive power of initial shame activation null. The results of this new 
model (which included diagnosable social anxiety as a predictor, but excluded initial 
shame activation to preserve degrees of freedom) indicated that individuals who are 
diagnosable with social anxiety tended to have lower state self-esteem at the onset of the 
task, β = -.50, t(37) = -5.07, p < .001, but also tended to improve their state self-esteem 
somewhat over the course of the study, β = .16, t(37) = 1.90, p = .066, although this 
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improvement was not statistically significant. Inclusion of diagnosable social anxiety as a 
predictor did not drastically influence the beta-weights or significance levels of 
habituation and variability in the intensity of shame as predictors, or the interpretation of 
other results. 
Thus, an average participant experienced a temporary loss of self-confidence at the 
conclusion of the study. The participants who possessed less self-confidence prior to the 
experimental task were more easily embarrassed at the onset of that task. The participants 
who successfully managed their embarrassment during the task, however, appeared to not 
lose their self-confidence or only lost very little, while those who fluctuated between 
weak and strong feelings of embarrassment lost the most self-confidence. The same 
caution as mentioned previously applies to interpreting the coefficients of within session 
habituation of shame and variability in shame due to statistical suppression, while initial 
shame activation coefficient can be interpreted as usual. 
Hypothesis 2 results summary. 
Overall, it appears that Hypothesis 2 was partially substantiated. Both habituation 
and variability in the intensity of emotional states were predictive of change on 
behavioral and emotional outcome measures. A surprising finding was that the 
relationship between habituation and variability in the intensity of emotions turned out to 
be more complicated than initially thought. 
The hypothesis was not substantiated to a degree in that shame did not appear to be 
more central than fear in the context of exposure task for individuals with fear of public 
speaking. However, somewhat in line with the hypothesis, shame appeared to be on par 
with fear in the sense that emotional processes related to shame predicted change in state 
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self-esteem, while emotional processes related to fear predicted change in speech 
performance quality. Moreover, this finding underlines the importance of multi-modal 
assessment strategy in the context of exposure to feared situations, since not including 
one of the modalities of assessment just mentioned would overlook one of the current 
findings. 
Testing hypothesis 3: Do physiological indices predict outcomes? 
Experimental group did not predict increase in LF/HF ratio. 
There was a significant linear increase, β = .23, t(77) = 3.80, p < .001, for ratio of 
low to high frequency components of recorded heart rate variability (LF/HF) over the 
course of the experiment. This indicates there was an increase in LF/HF ratio from the 5-
minute baseline to the first speech, followed by further increase after the experimental 
task to the second speech. However, participant membership in any of the experimental 
groups (including the control group) did not influence this increase. Thus, while the 
experimental task (including the control task) appeared to make an impact on the 
participants, resulting in increased physiological arousal over time, any differences 
between the experimental conditions were too subtle to be detected. Means and standard 
deviations of LF/HF ratios are presented in Appendix J. 
Lower LF/HF ratio predicts deterioration of state self-esteem (SSES). 
Change in LF/HF ratio was operationalized as a simple difference between LF/HF 
ratio during the first 3-minute experimental task (e.g. watching the video or solving the 
word puzzles) and the third, and last, 3-minute task. Change in LF/HF ratio during the 
experimental task did not predict changes on behavioral or emotional outcome measures 
from before the experimental task to after the task. Average LF/HF ratio was 
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operationalized as arithmetic average of LF/HF ratio for all three 5-minute experimental 
task segments. Higher average LF/HF ratio (indicating lower heart rate variability) during 
the experimental task predicted a worsening in state self-esteem from before the 
experimental task to after the task (β = -.18, t(37) = -2.21, p = .034). These results 
indicate that lower heart rate variability may indeed reflect poor emotion regulation 
capacity, as suggested by the literature (e.g. Appelhans & Luecken, 2006), which may 
lead to a temporary decrease in self-esteem due to difficulty regulating emotions arising 
out of the challenges the experimental task posed. It is important to note, however, that 
this particular analysis did not pass the deviance test, χ2(2) = 5.36, p = .067, and thus 
should be interpreted as very tentative. 
HF component of HRV positively correlates with habituation of emotional states. 
While high frequency (HF) component of heart rate variability (HRV) during the 
experimental task did not directly predict change on behavioral or emotion outcome 
measures from before the task to after the task, it significantly correlated with emotional 
processes variables. Given the statistical suppression between habituation and variability 
in emotion intensity, partial correlations were studied between HF component of HRV 
and these emotional process variables. The partial correlations revealed that HF 
component of HRV significantly correlated with habituation in fear (r = .40, p = .014; 
when controlled for variability in the intensity of fear) and shame (r = .56, p < .001; when 
controlled for variability in the intensity of shame) during the experimental task. At the 
same time, HF component of HRV negatively correlated with variability in the intensity 
of fear (r = -.26, p = .117; when controlled for habituation of fear) and variability in the 
intensity of shame (r = -.48, p = .003; when controlled for habituation of shame). While 
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one of the correlations did not reach statistical significance, correlations between HF 
component of HRV and variability in the intensity of emotions were in the consistently 
negative direction.  
These results indicate that habituation, or decrease in the intensity of subjective 
emotional states appears to coincide with lessened physiological arousal due to the 
activation of parasympathetic nervous system. Conversely, variability in the intensity of 
emotional states coincided with increased physiological arousal due to parasympathetic 
withdrawal, but also potentially sympathetic activation, or both. Means and standard 
deviations of HF component of recorded heart rate variability are presented in Appendix 
K. 
Hypothesis 3 results summary. 
Hypothesis 3 was substantiated because higher LF/HF ratio, which indicates lower 
heart rate variability, correlated with a deterioration in state self-esteem from before to 
after the experimental task. This is consistent with the idea that lower heart rate 
variability indicates a deficit in emotional processing capacity, which would lead an 
individual to struggle coping with the demands posed by the experimental task. 
At the same time, the high frequency component of recorded heart rate variability 
positively correlated with habituation in the intensity of emotional states. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that habituation (in the sense of a reduction in the reported 
intensity of emotions) may reflect an inhibitory process involving the amygdala-vACC-
vmPFC inhibitory circuit. Even so, this particular interpretation should be taken with 
considerable caution, since it is based on a theoretical inference, rather than 
neuroimaging results. 
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Figure 2. Effect of habituation of fear during combined experimental tasks on 
speech performance. 
 
Notes. The graph is plotted for an average individual with either high or low 
habituation during the task (±1SD from the mean) at average levels of initial fear 
activation and variability in fear. Higher scores represent better performance. This 
graph shows that individuals who do not become more at ease during the task 
improve their speech performance, while those who experience a reduction of 
anxiety see a slight speech performance drop. The graph is based on n = 41 
participants. 
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Figure 3. Effect of variability of fear during combined experimental tasks on speech 
performance. 
 
Notes. The graph is plotted for an average individual with either high or low 
variability of fear during the task (±1SD from the mean) at average levels of initial 
fear activation and within session habituation in fear. Higher scores represent better 
performance. The graph indicates that individuals who experience more pronounced 
highs and lows of anxiety during the task improve their speech performance, while 
those who have a more stable experience of anxiety see a slight speech performance 
drop. The graph is based on n = 41 participants. 
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Figure 4. Effect of habituation of shame during combined experimental tasks on 
state self-esteem. 
 
Notes. The graph is plotted for an average individual with either high or low 
habituation of shame during the task (±1SD from the mean) at average levels of 
initial shame activation and average variability in shame. Higher scores represent 
better self-esteem. This graph shows that individuals who are able to regulate and 
reduce their experience of shame tend to keep confidence in themselves, while 
those who are not tend to lose that confidence. The graph is based on n = 41 
participants. 
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Figure 5. Effect of variability in shame during combined experimental tasks on 
state self-esteem. 
 
Notes. The graph is plotted for an average individual with either high or low 
variability of shame during the task (±1SD from the mean) at average levels of 
initial shame activation and within session habituation in shame. Higher scores 
represent better self-esteem. This graph indicates that individuals who are able to 
maintain an emotionally stable experience, in so far as shame is concerned, tend to 
preserve their self-esteem. In contrast, those who experience significant highs and 
lows in the intensity of feeling shame lose their confidence. The graph is based on n 
= 41 participants. 
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Exposure treatments have been found to be an effective treatment for a variety of 
psychological disorders, but the mechanisms behind them remain somewhat elusive. 
Emotion processing theory’s view (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa, Huppert, & Cahill, 2006) 
stressed the importance of within- and between-session habituation of fear as the 
principal therapeutic component, but the theory behind this mechanism of change has 
recently been questioned (i.e., Culver et al., 2012; Craske et al., 2014). Inhibitory 
learning theory proposed a different set of processes that occur during exposure to predict 
outcomes, among them, increased variability in fear and sustained physiological arousal. 
Verbal processes appear to influence the course of exposure as well, likely through the 
interaction between two neural streams that underlie both extinction and processing of 
emotions. The present study investigated whether verbalizing and elaborating on 
emotional experience contributes to changes over the course of an exposure task. 
Additionally, this study investigated a set of predictors of therapeutic change postulated 
by emotion processing theory and inhibitory learning theory, and additionally 
investigated whether the discrete emotion of shame was also important, as suggested by 
theory from emotion focused therapy. This was done in the context of a speech task in an 
analog sample of college students who reported both fear of public speaking and 
symptoms of social anxiety. 
The study investigated whether verbal elaboration on emotional experience 
contributes to changes in behavioral and emotional outcomes during exposure to feared 
situations, as well as tested predictors of such change postulated by two competing 
theories, the emotion processing theory, and the inhibitory learning theory. The results 
offer mixed support for the hypothesis that verbal elaboration of emotional experience 
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during an exposure task improves the outcome of exposure-based interventions. The 
study also found some support for predictors postulated by both emotion processing 
theory and inhibitory learning theory, but also found that the relationship between these 
predictors may be more complicated than previously thought. Finally, this study found 
evidence that process predictors specifically related to shame may be as important as 
processes related to fear, but that effect may depend on the modality (i.e., method) by 
which outcomes are measured.  
Physiological findings indicate that overall lower heart rate variability (HRV) 
during the task was associated with a decrease in state self-esteem from before the task to 
after the task. This finding is consistent with the theory that heart rate variability is an 
index of emotion regulation, and lower heart rate variability likely reflects deficits in 
emotion regulation capacity (Appelhans & Leucken, 2006), leading to a temporary 
deterioration of self-esteem due to difficulty managing challenges that the experimental 
task posed. In addition to that, vagally-mediated heart rate variability, indexed by high 
frequency component of HRV, correlated positively with habituation in both fear and 
shame (when controlled for variability in the intensity of these emotions). These findings 
raise an intriguing (albeit speculative) possibility that high frequency component of HRV 
reflects the engagement of the amygdala-vACC-vmPFC inhibitory circuit, meaning that 
habituation of emotional states, such as fear or shame, may be an index of inhibitory 
learning taking place, so long as variability in the intensity of emotional states is taken 
into account as well. It is important to note that this particular conclusion is based on 
extrapolation beyond the data produced by the current study. 
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Experiential group showed greater behavioral change as compared to 
Exposure group 
Hypothesis 1 predicted greater cognitive and emotional changes in the experiential 
group (i.e., exposure plus experiential processing), as compared to exposure alone, or to 
the control group. This hypothesis was supported to a degree, in that while group 
membership was unable to predict changes in self-esteem, it did predict behavioral 
changes. First, the results confirm that all three groups were equal on the initial speech 
performance prior to the experimental manipulation. Second, experiential and exposure 
groups taken together improved in their speech performance over the control group, 
while experiential group improved to a greater degree as compared to exposure group. 
However, in both cases, the improvement effect size magnitude was small. In addition to 
that, diagnosable social anxiety differentiated individuals on the basis of the quality of 
their initial speech performance and state self-esteem at the onset of the study, with more 
socially anxious individuals being worse off in both categories. 
While group membership overall was a weak predictor of change in speech 
performance, statistical power should be considered in the interpretation of this result. 
The true effect size of a single-session experimental manipulation in an analog sample 
with a relatively low severity of symptoms is likely to be very small, meaning that a very 
large sample is needed to obtain sufficient power. The study was only able to recruit 41 
individuals, and with a sample size this modest the analysis comparing the groups was 
underpowered, resulting in inconclusive findings regarding the effects of experimental 
groups. 
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Habituation and variability in emotional arousal predict change - but in opposite 
directions 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that variability in the subjective emotional states of fear and 
shame during the non-control experimental tasks will be more predictive of change on the 
outcome measures compared to traditional predictors (initial fear activation and within 
session habituation). Variability in the intensity of both fear and shame emotional 
processes during all three experimental tasks, including the control group, were 
predictive of changes on the outcome measures, although the relationships among these 
emotional processes and the outcomes appeared to be more complex than initially 
thought. While the participants improved their speech performance on average, likely due 
to practice effects, greater habituation of fear (i.e., reduced within-task experience of fear 
from its peak to the end of task) during the experimental task (when controlled for 
variability in fear levels) predicted worsening in speech performance. This somewhat 
counterintuitive finding might be explained by the idea of optimal arousal proposed by 
Catherall (2003) and Hayes et al. (2012). It is possible that individuals who habituated 
experienced a lower degree of arousal which was somewhat detrimental to their 
performance, while those who did not habituate experienced an optimal amount of 
arousal which nonetheless never reached levels high enough to be detrimental to 
performance. In contrast, greater variability in fear during the experimental task (when 
controlled for the simultaneous habituation of fear) predicted improvement in speech 
delivery. Diagnosable social anxiety was associated with lower self-esteem prior to the 
experimental task, higher fear at the onset of experimental task, and also with a slight 
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improvement in state self-esteem over the course of the study. This predictor otherwise 
did not significantly impact any other findings. 
The findings discussed above are consistent with Culver et al. (2012) study, in 
which the participants could stop their speech at any point but were encouraged to deliver 
speeches lasting up to 2 minutes, which resulted in a behavioral measure of speech 
duration. That study found that when participants did not substantially habituate to fear 
within the session, it seemed to allow an improved behavioral performance and predicted 
participants delivering a longer speech at one week follow-up after the study. The current 
study also found that less habituation predicted higher overall quality of speech 
performance (because greater habituation predicted worse performance). However, both 
Culver et al. (2012) and Kircanski et al. (2012) found that variability in fear levels during 
exposure (i.e., the standard deviation of fear levels during the task), as measured on the 
SUDS scale, predicted lower fear levels during the follow-up, also measured by the 
SUDS scale. The current study further extended those findings, suggesting that greater 
variability in one’s reported levels of fear is predictive of an outcome measure that was 
not SUDS-based. In other words, many of these prior studies used some variation of 
SUDS score to predict SUDS score in the future. In contrast, the current study used 
SUDS as a predictor of future outcome that was not also measured using some variation 
of SUDS. This difference in method adds confidence to the understanding that 
habituation and variability in the intensity of fear (as well as shame) are important 
predictors of behavioral and emotional outcomes.  
The current study found no effect of habituation or variability in fear on either self-
reported public speaking confidence or on speaker’s negative thoughts related to how 
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others perceive him or her, echoing the findings of Culver et al. (2012). The latter study 
found no effect of either within session habituation or variability in fear on the 
confidence participants had in their speaking ability or on the fearful thoughts they 
experienced during public speaking. Thus, it is possible that experienced fear may be a 
better predictor for some modalities of outcome measurement (such as behavioral 
performance) than cognitive or emotional measures of anxiety over public speaking.  
The gradual attenuation of arousal is a critical aspect of emotion processing theory, 
while inhibitory learning theory argues that any kind of highly aroused experience can 
lead to the eventual down-regulation of emotion. On one hand, the findings discussed 
above are not consistent with the emotion processing theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986) 
because habituation of fear was unexpectedly found to be hindering, rather than helpful, 
for the outcome of speech performance; meanwhile, greater variability in the intensity of 
fear predicted improvement in performance from before to after the experimental task, 
consistent with the inhibitory learning theory. This improvement may have been due to 
variability in fear levels reflecting a change in the expectancy of harm, or possibly due to 
being exposed to a variety of internal fear contexts or fear cues of different intensity, 
which are thought to strengthen new inhibitory learning and generalize it to different 
contexts (Craske et al., 2014). On the other hand, much in line with the emotion 
processing theory (although not directly predicted by it since this theory is only 
concerned with fear), habituation of shame during the exposure task was found to have 
beneficial effects on state self-esteem. At the same time greater variability in the intensity 
of shame proved to be detrimental, contrary to the inhibitory learning theory (with the 
caveat that, in the same way as emotion processing theory, inhibitory learning theory is 
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also concerned only with fear rather than shame). Thus, the findings of this study appear 
to partially support and partially refute both theories. 
An inconsistent association between the traditional predictors postulated in emotion 
processing theory (e.g. within session habituation) and clinical outcomes has been clearly 
illustrated in prior research (i.e., Craske et al., 2008). Inhibitory learning in general is 
known to be highly context-dependent (Quirk & Beer, 2006), which may be a key to 
understanding this inconsistency. If all emotions indeed rely on the same general neural 
processes of appraisal and regulation (Etkin et al., 2011), where emotion regulation 
relies on the inhibitory input (Kanske et al., 2010), and extinction is indeed a special case 
of emotion regulation (Quirk & Beer, 2006), then the emergence and regulation of other 
emotions may be just as important in predicting the effects of exposure, serving as a vital 
internal context that so far has been largely overlooked. 
Change in shame is an important predictor of emotional outcomes during exposure 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that irrespective of intervention, the experience of shame is 
more predictive of the change on the behavioral and emotional outcome measures than 
experience of fear. It appears that the experience of fear and shame are processes that 
each predict change in outcomes, albeit on different measures of outcomes. Fear and 
shame were each somewhat predictive of functioning prior to the experimental 
manipulation, as evidenced by the relationship between social anxiety scores, first speech 
performance, and the initial activation of both these emotion states during the 
experimental task. While fear was the strongest predictor of changes in behavioral 
performance, shame was the strongest predictor of change in emotional well-being. 
General theoretical issues 
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In light of the findings in this study, four issues may need to be addressed by future 
research. The first issue is that habituation and variability in the emotions of fear and 
shame were found to be highly correlated with each other. The second is that the terms 
habituation and extinction are poorly differentiated in the exposure therapy research 
literature. Third, the most commonly used measure of fear, the SUDS, may measure more 
than one construct. Fourth, most of the research has focused so far on studying processes 
related to fear, when other emotions, such as shame, may be as important. These issues 
are discussed in the sub-sections that follow.  
Habituation and variability of emotion intensity have a complex relationship. 
The relationship between within session habituation (i.e., the reduction of arousal 
from its peak to its last measurement within a given exposure session) and variability 
(i.e., variance of intensity of arousal within any given exposure session) in fear is 
complicated, in that they are positively correlated with one another but predict same 
outcomes (e.g. speech performance) in opposite directions. This finding may shed light 
on why within session habituation of fear has a troubled history as a predictor of clinical 
outcomes. Within session habituation is a construct that is often measured by a simple 
reduction from peak SUDS score and final SUDS score of each exposure session (Craske 
et al., 2008). Emotional variability has been measured as a standard deviation of SUDS 
scores averaged across exposure sessions (Kircanski et al., 2012). These measures are, 
unsurprisingly, highly correlated, because they are each calculated based on the 
presenting range of original SUDS scores, even though the constructs they measure 
remain distinct. Thus, it is possible that past literature studying these measures may have 
looked at the effects of within session habituation without simultaneously considering 
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emotion variability (and the other way around), and as a result, some instances of 
habituation likely occurred in the context of low emotion variability, while others were 
observed in the context of high emotion variability. Because it appears that these 
constructs predict change in opposite directions, the result of any analysis which does not 
take into account both variables at the same time may be a diluted, or even null, effect. 
This represents a statistical suppressor relationship, and in case it extends to other 
samples, future researchers should be cautioned that the effects of within session 
habituation of fear may be underestimated if the variability in fear intensity is not 
simultaneously considered. An additional consideration here is that a decrease from 
highest to last SUDS score, which a usual operational definition of within-session 
habituation, will automatically produce variability in measurement, thus the correlation. 
This may be especially true of the present study, since it measured SUDS over a 
relatively short period of time, which potentially did not give enough time for 
individuals’ emotional experience to fluctuate substantially (although such fluctuation 
was observed, see Appendix M). 
Physiological findings in this study furthermore suggest that different physiological 
processes underlie habituation and variability in the intensity of emotion. It appears that 
habituation in both fear and shame are correlated with inhibitory activity by the prefrontal 
areas, while variability in the intensity of these states are negatively correlated with it and 
may represent the influence of important contextual factors. 
Habituation and extinction are poorly differentiated. 
In actual practice, it is difficult to distinguish between habituation and extinction. In 
their article, Culver et al. (2012) say that they use the term habituation to stay consistent 
 62 
 
 
with the literature terminology, while clarifying that a more accurate term is extinction. 
While this study follows the same convention, the word habituation here refers to an 
observation of attenuation of reported fear (or shame), rather than an underlying 
mechanism of change. The reason for this is that while habituation and extinction are 
theoretically distinct, distinguishing them by observing behavior or asking for self-report 
is probably impossible. Habituation is a non-associative form of learning that results in a 
decrease in response due to the repeated presentation of a stimulus, which is not the result 
of sensory adaptation or fatigue (Rankin et al., 2009). In contrast, extinction is an 
associative form of learning that is defined as a loss of responding to a fear cue when it is 
no longer followed by an aversive stimulus, because the cue loses its informative value 
and effectively becomes a meaningless signal (Bouton, 2002). Habituation has been 
proposed to be at least partially responsible for the extinction of learned fear 
(McSweeney & Swindell, 2002; Myers & Davis, 2007). While theoretically distinct, in 
practice the lines separating the two processes are blurry. The processes share multiple 
overlapping characteristics, such as spontaneous return of fear seen in the presence of a 
previously habituated or extinguished stimulus, or the negative exponential function 
shown by participants’ responses during either habituation or extinction (McSweeney & 
Swindell, 2002). Neural mechanisms of extinction have recently received some attention 
(and overlap to a significant degree with neural mechanisms of emotion regulation; Quirk 
& Beer, 2006), but neural mechanisms behind habituation less so, and although it appears 
that both processes involve N-methyl-d-aspartate (NMDA) receptors, this area requires 
more research (Storsve, McNally, & Richardson, 2010). These points highlight the 
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practical problem in deciding whether the observed process that is used to predict 
outcomes is habituation, extinction, or perhaps even both. 
SUDS may measure multiple constructs. 
Another point is that while SUDS (i.e, units of “distress”) is purportedly a measure 
of “fear,” part of the inconsistency in how well it predicts outcomes may be due to 
different participants reporting different experiences by stating their SUDS score. 
LeDoux (2013) distinguishes between a conscious emotion of fear, which involves top-
down processes and cognitive appraisal, and what he calls a defensive organismic state 
characterized by the stimulus-elicited behavioral responses (such as fighting, fleeing, or 
freezing) and physiological changes due to the activity of the autonomic nervous system, 
such as increase in heart rate and skin conductance, in response to a tacitly anticipated 
threat that is processed in part through the amygdala circuits. A close equivalent to 
defensive organismic state would be global distress in emotion focused therapy (not to be 
confused with emotion processing theory). While SUDS is a tried and true measure, in its 
current form it does not distinguish between a state of arousal with little cognitive 
involvement and a state of arousal where substantial cognitive processing of emotional 
material is taking place. In other words, qualitative and meaning-laden differences 
between distress in “high cognition” vs. “low cognition” are not differentiated using a 
single rating. One possibility to address this issue is to use widely available, affordable 
and convenient sport heart rate monitors to supplement SUDS measurement during 
exposure. For example, an individual who gives a high SUDS rating but whose heart rate 
variability is high or moderate may be engaged in more cognitive processing of “raw 
neural materials” (as LeDoux, 2013, calls it) compared to an individual who gives a high 
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SUDS rating and experiences low heart rate variability. This theoretical and somewhat 
speculative possibility may be worth investigating in further studies. 
Variability in levels of fear may indicate that other emotional experiences can 
become salient in individual’s awareness, which would imply that more advanced 
emotion processing occurs, in the sense used by LeDoux (2013). If we take fear to mean 
defensive organismic state or global distress, then any emotion, even shame, is more 
advanced in its specificity of meaning. As discussed earlier, due to the dynamic nature of 
emotional experience dominant and sub-dominant emotions may coexist, and as the 
intensity of one emotion fades, another one may become more prominent in the 
immediate experience (Pascual-Leone, Paivio, & Harrington, 2016). If there is variability 
in global distress, there may be access to other emotions in the awareness, which is a 
possibility that can be investigated empirically in the future studies. 
Emotional processes of shame, not just fear, can be important predictors of 
outcomes. 
This study found that emotional processes (i.e. habituation and variability) related 
to shame emerged as important predictors on par with emotional processes related to fear, 
albeit in relation to different kinds of outcomes. While processes related to fear predicted 
behavioral outcomes (i.e. quality of speech performance), those related to shame 
predicted emotional ones (i.e. state self-esteem). This finding echoes somewhat a 
suggestion by Catherall (2003) and LeDoux (2013) that systems of different modalities 
(i.e. nonconscious vs. conscious) may be affected by different interventions, or perhaps, 
in the current case, different processes. 
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An additional possibility is that that certain emotions may hold special importance 
in relation to exposure treatment of certain disorders. Just as shame has been considered 
an important process in relation to social anxiety (Shahar, 2013), Kircanski et al. (2012) 
cite studies which state that in contamination-related obsessive compulsive disorder a 
feeling of disgust characterizes the condition as much as fear. Further research should 
examine this possibility. 
Methodological implications 
Two important methodological implications emerged from this research. The first 
one is the issue of multimodal measurement. In this study, emotional processes related to 
fear (i.e. its habituation and its variability), as suggested by both emotion processing and 
inhibitory learning theories, were found to be predictive of change on behavioral, but not 
emotional self-report measures. Meanwhile, indices related to shame were found to be 
predictive of change on emotional but not behavioral measures. The second 
methodological implication is related to choice of analytical strategy when examining 
these process variables. Given the possibility of statistical suppression between 
habituation and emotion variability in other samples, future studies looking to test 
emotion processing theory against inhibitory learning theory should follow the advice of 
Paulhus and colleagues (2004), which is to avoid using exploratory analysis strategies 
such as forward stepwise regression, because they are almost certain to overlook 
suppression. Thus, future work should take care to evaluate both habituation and 
variability in the intensity of emotion as predictors simultaneously as a precaution. 
Clinical implications 
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One of the main clinical implications of the current study is a possibility that a 
reduction in subjective sense of distress or fear is not always a desirable or effective 
target during exposure treatment, while a focus on increasing the variability in intensity 
of these states is. These findings are mostly in line with the inhibitory learning theory 
(e.g. Craske et al., 2014), but also appear to mostly have implications in regards to 
behavioral outcomes while having little effect on emotional ones. At the same time, the 
focus on diminishing a subjective sense of shame may present itself as a desirable target 
in relation to improving the emotional outcomes of treatment. This finding is much in 
line with theory based on emotion focused therapy (Shahar, 2013) which treats shame as 
a core primary process maintaining social anxiety, while relegating fear to a secondary 
place. Of course, these findings may extend only as far as performance in social 
situations in individuals with social anxiety traits is concerned.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The study has a number of limitations. The study utilized an analog design, so 
generalizing these findings to a clinical intervention should be done with caution. The 
second one has to do with recruitment and retention of participants (recall Appendix E). 
A high number of individuals (n = 161) screened online and meeting all study criteria 
showed initial interest in attending the current study on-site, but only 45 individuals 
actually followed through. In addition to that, 4 individuals who attended chose to 
terminate their participation in the study early. With respect to participant recruitment, it 
is difficult to explain why they chose to not further pursue the on-site part of the study. 
One possibility is that, given fear of evaluation which defines individuals with Social 
Anxiety Disorder (whether clinical or subclinical), some participants may have decided 
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that the study would be too stressful for them. On the other hand, an alternative 
explanation is that because most of the individuals recruited through the Psychology 
Participant Pool take part in studies because it is a course requirement, they could have 
chosen to obtain a quick credit by finishing the online part of the study without having 
the intention to follow through. That, coupled with availability of other online studies 
through the Participant Pool may explain low follow-through rate of the participants in 
the current study. 
With regards to the dropout rate a dropout of almost 9% (n = 4) appears to be fairly 
high. However, the rate of the current study is still lower than Kircanski et al.’s (2012) 
study, which investigated exposure to contamination fears and had a dropout of 24% (n = 
12). While the dropout rate in the current study may reflect the inherent challenge of 
asking individuals with fear of public speaking facing such speaking in some form, it 
may also reflect a success of ongoing informed consent process, which was carried out in 
this study with special rigor. The study recruited university students whose social anxiety 
was less severe than that typically observed in Social Anxiety Disorder, although 31.7% 
of the sample met the diagnostic criteria based on a semi-structured interview conducted 
at the beginning of the study. Nonetheless, while recruitment did target individuals with 
more severe social anxiety, it may be that potential participants may have avoided being 
involved in the study on account of fear of being in a situation where they can be 
negatively judged by other individuals (e.g., the experimenter), which is the hallmark of 
social anxiety. Thus, it is likely that the effect size for this study was small and limited 
the study’s statistical power because individuals with more severe symptoms may have 
benefited more from the experimental task. Nevertheless, it is also possible that this study 
 68 
 
 
may be studying a more universal process of emotion regulation, where the difference 
between a clinical and a non-clinical sample may be one of degree, rather than that of a 
kind. 
Another unanticipated limitation in design was that while the instructions for the 
experiential group were specific, not all individuals in that condition followed them. For 
example, when one participant was asked about what emotions she experienced while 
watching herself give a speech on the video, she persisted (despite attempts at 
redirection) in describing her physical appearance and imperfections instead. Other 
individuals reported their thoughts rather than emotions, and so on. Thus, while the 
instructions were standard for all participants within any given group (similar to 
instructions in the study by Nilsson and colleagues, 2012), participants showed a wide 
range of idiosyncratic responses, some of which were not adherent to the intention of the 
assigned condition. If there is a strong effect of emotion verbalization on exposure, it was 
almost certainly diluted in these ways.  
Related to that, another limitation of the study is that the participants in the control 
group experienced the same amount of anxiety during their “control” task as the 
participants did in the two other conditions. In other words, despite being told that they 
will not be evaluated on the control task, participants in that condition were as stressed 
solving timed word puzzles as were participants that were asked to watch themselves 
multiple times on video. Finally, while the findings of this study shed some light on how 
verbalization of emotion and changes in fear and shame affect outcomes related to social 
anxiety, the findings may be limited to short-term changes only because follow-up 
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measurement was beyond the current research focus and thus the study design did not 
incorporate it. 
Finally, in regards to physiological recording, heart rate variability was calculated 
from a sports-grade equipment in recording intervals which were shorter than the 5-
minute intervals suggested by the measurement guidelines (Task Force of The European 
Society of Cardiology and The North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 
1996). Although the guidelines make provisions for shorter recording intervals, the 
current physiological recording can be judged as likely not being very accurate. 
Further research should consider three main issues. The first one is that while it 
appears that verbalization of emotion may influence exposure (e.g., Kircanski, 
Lieberman, & Craske, 2012), which may be a special case of emotion regulation (Quirk 
& Beer, 2006), the current study found mixed evidence to support this notion, primarily 
because the participants did not adhere closely to the experimental instructions. Further 
studies should explore this topic in more depth. 
The second issue is that given the complex relationship between habituation and 
variability in the intensity of emotional states, further research should follow Kazdin’s 
(2009) suggestion on the study of mechanisms of change: that these variables should be 
studied in parallel, competing mediation analyses should be considered to further 
elucidate the relationship these predictors have with each other and various outcomes. 
The third issue is that further research should try to incorporate physiological and 
neuroimaging data when it is possible or practical. While average heart rate was 
considered in previous studies (e.g. Culver et al., 2012), it yields relatively little 
information when compared to time-domain (e.g. SDNN, or the standard deviation of NN 
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intervals) and frequency-domain (e.g. LF/HF ratio, or the ratio of low frequency to high 
frequency components of heart rate signal) measures of heart rate variability, which are 
regarded as indices closely related to emotion regulation (Appelhans & Leucken, 2006). 
This physiological link, ideally recorded with ECG-accurate equipment, can connect 
exposure research to the broader study of emotion regulation. 
Conclusions 
Both habituation and variability in fear and shame emerged as significant predictors 
of change on behavioral and emotional measures in the course of an exposure task, 
supporting both inhibitory learning theory as well as indirectly supporting the emotion 
processing theory. Due to the apparent complex association between these predictors 
their effects during exposure seem to be dependent on each other and need to be studied 
further. It appears that both emotion processing theory and inhibitory learning theory may 
be correct to a degree. The current study suggests that habituation may be an index of 
inhibitory learning (or at the very least an index of inhibitory activity), while variability 
in the intensity of emotion may represent the influence of important contextual variables. 
Thus, these competing theories may be reconciled with future research which takes both 
predictors into account and investigates their physiological underpinnings. 
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Appendix A 
Specific verbal instructions for the study 
ALL GROUPS 
VIDEO INSTRUCTION PRE 
After you fill out some questionnaires, I will ask you to pick a topic, anything you 
want, and give a short speech. You will have 3 minutes to prepare the speech, and 3 more 
minutes to deliver it. If you run out of things to say and need to change topics, you can do 
so, just try to keep talking for three minutes. This video camera will be recording the 
whole time. Later your video will be evaluated by two expert judges. If you get too 
distressed to continue the study, you can stop at any time by saying "stop" and we will 
stop. Remember, you can't take any written notes. 
CONTROL GROUP 
INSTRUCTION A 
Now, there will be a few tasks for you to accomplish. In the next three minutes, solve 
as many word puzzles as you can. In these word puzzles the letters are mixed up. Just 
write down what word the letters really make next to the jumbled letters. You will not be 
graded on this task. 
INSTRUCTION B 
Let’s do a second sheet of word puzzles. Like before, you will have 3 minutes, and 
you will not be graded. 
INSTRUCTION C 
Let’s do the last sheet of word puzzles. The instructions are the same as before. 
EXPOSURE GROUP 
INSTRUCTION A 
We will watch the recording multiple times. As you watch, try to notice when you 
feel self-conscious, embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your 
body, any urges to do anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. Remember 
that this is not a test. Just stay engaged with watching the video. 
INSTRUCTION B 
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Let’s watch the video again. As before, notice when you feel self-conscious, 
embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your body, any urges to do 
anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. 
INSTRUCTION C 
Let’s watch it a final time. As before, notice when you feel self-conscious, 
embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your body, any urges to do 
anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. 
EXPERIENTIAL GROUP 
INSTRUCTION A 
We will watch the recording multiple times. As you watch, try to notice when you 
feel self-conscious, embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your 
body, any urges to do anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. Remember 
that this is not a test. Just stay engaged with watching the video. 
TASK A 
Now I want to ask you some questions. These questions are not a test. I want us both 
to better understand what it was like for you watching yourself on the video. 
- Describe what it felt like in your body while you were watching?  
- Tell me about any thoughts or images that came into your mind while watching? 
- Describe any feelings or emotions you had while watching? 
- Tell me about anything else that you've noticed I haven't asked about? 
INSTRUCTION B 
Let's watch the video again. As before, notice when you feel self-conscious, 
embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your body, any urges to do 
anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. 
TASK B 
 Let's see what has been going on for you this time. 
- What feelings did you have while watching this time? 
- See if you can put more words to these feelings? 
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- I wonder if these feelings tell you something about what you want, need, or 
deserve? 
INSTRUCTION C 
Let's watch it a final time. As before, notice when you feel self-conscious, 
embarrassed, or on the spot. Notice what feelings you have in your body, any urges to do 
anything or act in some way, or emotions that you feel. 
TASK C 
- What feelings came up this time? 
- What has changed for you over the different times you watched the video? 
- Of all the things you noticed during these exercises, what stands out to you as the 
most important? 
ALL GROUPS 
VIDEO INSTRUCTION POST 
After you fill out another set of questionnaires, I will ask you to pick a different topic 
of your choosing and give another, different, speech. Like before, you will have 3 
minutes to prepare and 3 minutes to deliver the speech. If you run out of things to say and 
need to change topics, you can do so, just try to keep talking for three minutes. If you 
find yourself too distressed to continue the study, you can stop at any time by saying 
"stop". Later on this speech will be evaluated by two expert judges as well. Remember, 
you can't take any written notes. 
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Appendix B 
Correlation between process and outcome measures 
      Measure 
  
SUDS 
initial 
activation 
   
SUDS 
habituation 
   
SUDS 
variability 
   
SSGS 
initial 
activation 
   
SSGS 
habituation 
   
SSGS 
variability 
 
SIAS/SPS Pre 
 
.588**  .190  .157  .445
**
  .400
**
  .430
**
 
SIAS/SPS Post 
 
.575
**
  .159  .114  .534
**
  .424
**
  .493
**
 
SPRS-M Pre 
 
-.436
**
  -.141  -.181  -.378
*
  -.235  -.215 
SPRS-M Post 
 
-.324
*
  -.206  -.170  -.463
**
  -.330
*
  -.248 
BFNE-S Pre 
 
.464
**
  .084  .081  .290  .128  .259 
BFNE-S Post 
 
.528
**
  .157  .145  .490
**
  .268  .452
**
 
BPRCS Pre 
 
-.523
**
  -.271  -.307  -.543
**
  -.222  -.517
**
 
BPRCS Post 
 
-.625
**
  -.280  -.282  -.497
**
  -.247  -.426
**
 
SSES Pre 
 
-.517
**
  .012  .023  -.531
**
  -.369
*
  -.444
**
 
SSES Post  -.463**   .048   .036   -.569
**
   -.291   -.515
**
 
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; SSGS = State Shame and Guilt Scale; SIAS/SPS = Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale-6/Social Phobia Scale-6 combined; SPRS-M = Social Performance Rating Scale-
Modified; BFNE-S = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation – Straightforward items; BPRCS = Brief Personal 
Record of Confidence as a Speaker; SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale. ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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Appendix C 
Correlations between process measures 
    
  
Average 
LF/HF 
ratio 
SSGS 
initial 
activation 
SSGS 
habituation 
SSGS 
variability 
SUDS 
initial 
activation 
SUDS 
habituation 
SUDS 
variability 
Average HF component -.854** -.031 .346* -.023 .065 .433** .316 
Average LF/HF ratio 
 
-.066 -.394
*
 -.046 -.037 -.287 -.207 
SSGS initial activation 
  
.594
**
 .779
**
 .521
**
 .076 .063 
SSGS habituation 
   
.756
**
 .251 .244 .112 
SSGS variability 
    
.372
*
 .088 .081 
SUDS initial activation 
     
.403
**
 .377
*
 
SUDS habituation 
      
.932
**
 
Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale; SSGS = State Shame and Guilt Scale. ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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Appendix D 
Correlations between outcome variables 
  
SIAS 
/SPS  
Pre 
 
SIAS 
/SPS  
Post 
 
SPRS-
M Pre 
 
SPRS-
M Post 
 
BFNE-
S Pre 
 
BFNE-
S Post 
 
PRCS 
Pre 
 
PRCS 
Post 
 
SSES 
Pre 
 
SSES 
Post 
 
SIAS/SPS Pre 1 .907
**
 -.303 -.278 .626
**
 .604
**
 -.477
**
 -.515
**
 -.640
**
 -.420
**
 
SIAS/SPS Post 
 
1 -.283 -.313
*
 .608
**
 .681
**
 -.487
**
 -.572
**
 -.658
**
 -.522
**
 
SPRS-M Pre 
  
1 .851
**
 -.067 -.211 .423
**
 .462
**
 .390
*
 .343
*
 
SPRS-M Post 
   
1 -.059 -.238 .412
**
 .461
**
 .415
**
 .348
*
 
BFNE-S Pre 
    
1 .869
**
 -.352
*
 -.339
*
 -.696
**
 -.604
**
 
BFNE-S Post 
     
1 -.472
**
 -.524
**
 -.694
**
 -.686
**
 
BPRCS Pre 
      
1 .811
**
 .328
*
 .374
*
 
BPRCS Post 
       
1 .398
*
 .408
**
 
SSES Pre 
        
1 .821
**
 
SSES Post 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Note. SIAS/SPS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale-6/Social Phobia Scale-6 combined; SPRS-M = Social 
Performance Rating Scale-Modified; BFNE-S = Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation – Straightforward items; 
BPRCS = Brief Personal Record of Confidence as a Speaker; SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale. ** p < .01; * p < 
.05. 
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Appendix E 
Participant recruitment PRISMA flow chart. Adapted from Moher et al. (2009). 
 
  Participants screened online 
(n = 318) 
Met social anxiety screen criteria 
(n = 212) 
Met all screening criteria 
(n = 161) 
Did not return for in-person study  
(n = 116) 
 
 
 
Returned for on-site study 
(n = 45) 
Completed the study 
(n = 41) 
Chose to not finish the study  
(n = 4) 
  
Did not meet other criteria 
(n = 51) 
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Appendix F 
Basic demographic information for the sample 
Group N Female SAD dx 
SIAS/SPS-6 
Pre Post 
Experiential 15 80.0% (n = 12) 20.0% (n = 3) 23.47 (8.48) 23.27 (8.89) 
Exposure 14 92.9% (n = 13) 42.9% (n = 6) 23.57 (8.78) 24.50 (7.92) 
Control 12 91.7% (n = 11) 33.3% (n = 4) 23.75 (6.54) 25.25 (7.33) 
Total 41 87.8% (n = 36) 31.7% (n = 13) 23.59 (7.87) 24.27 (7.97) 
Note.SAD dx = diagnosable Social Anxiety Disorder (DSM-V criteria); SIAS/SPS-6 = 
combined Social Interaction Anxiety Scale / Social Phobia Scale-6. Standard deviations are 
indicated in the brackets for SIAS/SPS-6. 
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Appendix G 
Means and standard deviations of outcome measures 
Group N 
SPRS-M BFNE-S PRCS SSES 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Experiential 15 
 
10.47 
(1.96) 
11.93 
(1.91) 
28.07 
(7.43) 
27.93 
(7.13) 
3.67 
(2.09) 
3.13 
(1.96) 
64.33 
(7.93) 
59.00 
(10.52) 
Exposure 14 
 
11.21 
(2.83) 
11.71 
(2.70) 
25.36 
(6.45) 
25.71 
(6.33) 
4.00 
(2.54) 
3.50 
(2.41) 
62.86 
(10.45) 
60.14 
(10.17) 
Control 12 
 
11.50 
(2.91) 
11.67 
(3.26) 
30.25 
(4.77) 
29.50 
(6.13) 
3.17 
(2.41) 
3.17 
(2.13) 
58.92 
(11.26) 
56.00 
(13.50) 
Total 41 
 
11.02 
(2.54) 
11.78 
(2.56) 
27.78 
(6.56) 
27.63 
(6.59) 
3.63 
(2.31) 
3.27 
(2.12) 
62.24 
(9.87) 
58.51 
(11.20) 
Note. SPRS-M = Social Performance Rating Scale-Modified; BFNE-S = Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation-Straightforward items; PRCS = Personal Record of Confidence as 
Speaker; SSES = State Self-Esteem Scale. Standard deviations for all measures are indicated 
in the brackets.  
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Appendix H 
Means and standard deviations of SUDS during the experimental task 
Group N 
SUDS 
1st task iteration 2nd task iteration 3rd task iteration 
Step 4b Step 4d Step 4b Step 4d Step 4b Step 4d 
Experiential 15 
 
64.2 
(26.7) 
53.5 
(26.1) 
50.3 
(25.5) 
44.8 
(26.9) 
41.9 
(24.9) 
37.7 
(22.8) 
Exposure 14 
 
66.9 
(24.3) 
59.6 
(21.1) 
56.1 
(24.7) 
49.9 
(28.1) 
47.9 
(27.9) 
46.7 
(27.0) 
Control 12 
 
73.3 
(20.0) 
52.5 
(20.6) 
52.9 
(22.2) 
47.1 
(23.2) 
45.4 
(22.3) 
45.00 
(24.3) 
Total 41 
 
67.8 
(23.8) 
55.3 
(22.6) 
53.02 
(23.9) 
47.2 
(25.7) 
45.0 
(24.7) 
42.9 
(24.4) 
 Note. SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress Scale. Standard deviations are 
indicated in the brackets.  
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Appendix I 
Means and standard deviations of SSGS during the experimental task 
Group N 
SSGS 
1st task iteration 2nd task iteration 3rd task iteration 
Step 4b Step 4d Step 4b Step 4d Step 4b Step 4d 
Experiential 15 
 
4.9  
(2.8) 
4.5  
(2.5) 
4.6  
(2.5) 
3.9  
(2.0) 
3.9  
(2.2) 
3.6  
(2.0) 
Exposure 14 
 
5.7  
(2.8) 
5.1  
(2.2) 
4.9  
(2.0) 
4.5  
(2.5) 
4.6  
(2.5) 
4.5  
(2.4) 
Control 12 
 
6.5  
(2.3) 
4.8  
(1.5) 
4.4 
(1.9) 
3.9  
(1.3) 
3.8  
(1.8) 
4.4  
(2.0) 
Total 41 
 
5.6  
(2.7) 
4.8  
(2.1) 
4.6 
(2.1) 
4.1  
(2.0) 
4.1  
(2.2) 
4.2  
(2.1) 
Note. SSGS = State Shame and Guilt Scale.  Standard deviations are indicated in the 
brackets.  
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Appendix J 
Measures of average LF/HF ratio at different times during the study 
Group N 
LF/HF ratio 
5-min 
Baseline 
First 
Speech 
1st task 
iteration 
2nd task 
iteration 
3rd task 
iteration 
Second 
Speech 
Experiential 15 
2.26 
(1.48) 
3.56 
(2.50) 
1.79 
(1.61) 
1.96 
(1.77) 
2.07 
(2.19) 
3.46 
(3.01) 
Exposure 13 
1.88 
(1.27) 
3.54 
(3.11) 
1.51 
(0.91) 
2.09 
(1.33) 
2.04 
(1.28) 
3.46 
(2.37) 
Control 11 
2.40 
(1.38) 
2.76 
(1.49) 
2.36 
(1.57) 
2.18 
(1.84) 
2.22 
(1.86) 
3.38 
(2.11) 
Total 39 
2.17 
(1.36) 
3.33 
(2.46) 
1.86 
(1.41) 
2.06 
(1.62) 
2.10 
(1.79) 
3.44 
(2.51) 
Note. LF/HF = a ratio of low to high frequency component of recorded heart rate 
variability. Standard deviations are indicated in the brackets.  
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Appendix K 
Measures of average HF component at different times during the study 
Group N 
HF 
5-min 
Baseline 
First 
Speech 
1st task 
iteration 
2nd task 
iteration 
3rd task 
iteration 
Second 
Speech 
Experiential 15 
 
0.34 
(0.13) 
0.27 
(0.15) 
0.41 
(0.18) 
0.39 
(0.15) 
0.42 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.12) 
Exposure 13 
 
0.37 
(0.14) 
0.29 
(0.16) 
0.36 
(0.11) 
0.33 
(0.10) 
0.37 
(0.16) 
0.27 
(0.11) 
Control 11 
 
0.31 
(0.15) 
0.27 
(0.09) 
0.33 
(0.19) 
0.34 
(0.14) 
0.39 
(0.20) 
0.27 
(0.12) 
Total 39 
 
0.34 
(0.14) 
0.28 
(0.14) 
0.37 
(0.6) 
0.36 
(0.13) 
0.39 
(0.19) 
0.27 
(0.11) 
Note. HF = normalized high frequency component of recorded heart rate 
variability. Standard deviations are indicated in the brackets. 
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Appendix L 
Study measures 
Demographics questionnaire 
Age. How old are you? ____________ 
Gender. Please circle.:    Female  Male  Specify if other: ____________ 
Do you have any of the following conditions? Please circle. 
1. Cardiovascular disease or high blood pressure? Y / N 
If yes, please specify: _____________________ 
2. Severe asthma or other respiratory disorder? Y / N 
If yes, please specify: ________________________ 
3. Hyperthyroidism or other endocrine disorder? Y / N 
If yes, please specify: ________________________ 
4. Epilepsy? Y / N 
Medication and substance use. Please circle. 
1. Are you currently prescribed and taking any psychiatric medication? 
 Benzodiazepines?  Y / N 
 Beta-blocker medication? Y / N 
 Other: _______________ 
2. In the past 30 days, what was your average alcohol intake? Please circle. 
 I do not drink       1-4 drinks/wk  5-9 drinks/wk        10 or more drinks/wk 
3. In the past 30 days, how often did you use cannabis? Please circle. 
 I didn't  Less than weekly    Almost every week        Almost every day 
4. In the past 30 days, have you used any other recreational drugs (e.g. LSD)? Y / N 
Suicidal ideation and self-harm. Please circle. 
1. In the past 30 days, have you had thoughts about killing yourself? Y / N 
2. In the past 30 days, have you engaged in self-harming (e.g. cutting)? Y / N 
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(Peters, Sunderland, Andrews, Rapee, & Mattick, 2012) 
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Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation, Straightforward Items  
(Carleton, Collimore, McCabe, & Antony, 2011; Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005) 
 
Please circle the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. 
 
 
 
Not at all 
characteri
stic of me 
A little 
characteri
stic of me 
Somewhat 
characterist
ic of me 
Very 
characteristic 
of me 
Entirely 
characteristic 
of me 
1. I worry about what other 
people will think of me 
even when I know it 
doesn't make any 
difference. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am frequently afraid of 
other people noticing 
my shortcomings. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I am afraid that others 
will not approve of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am afraid that other 
people will find fault 
with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. When I am talking to 
someone, I worry about 
what they may be 
thinking about me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am usually worried 
about what kind of 
impression I make. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Sometimes I think I am 
too concerned with 
what other people think 
of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I often worry that I will 
say or do wrong things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 Score:_______ 
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Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker 
(Hook, Smith, & Valentiner, 2008) 
See if the following statements apply to you. Please circle the answer. 
 
1. My hands tremble when I try to handle objects on the platform.   
 Y / N 
2. I am in constant fear of forgetting my speech.      
 Y / N 
3. While preparing a speech I am in a constant state of anxiety.    
 Y / N 
4. My thoughts become confused and jumbled when I speak before the audience. 
 Y / N 
5. Although I talk fluently with friends I am at a loss for words on the platform.  
 Y / N 
6. The faces of my audience are blurred when I look at them.    
 Y / N 
7. I feel disgusted with myself after trying to address a group of people.   
 Y / N 
8. I perspire and tremble just before getting up to speak.    
 Y / N 
9. My posture feels strained and unnatural.      
 Y / N 
10. I am fearful and tense all the while I am speaking before a group of people.  
 Y / N 
11. It is difficult for me to search my mind calmly for the right words to express my thoughts.
 Y / N 
12. I am terrified at the thought of speaking before a group of people.   
 Y / N 
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State Self-Esteem Scale 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) 
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this moment. There 
is of course no wrong answer for any statement. The best answer is what you feel is true 
of yourself at the moment. Be sure to answer all of the items, even if you are not certain 
of the best answer. Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW. 
 
1. I feel confident about my abilities.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
    
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
3. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
4. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance .  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
5. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
6. I feel that others respect and admire me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
7. I am dissatisfied with my weight.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
8. I feel self-conscious.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
9. I feel as smart as others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
10. I feel displeased with myself.  
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1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
11. I feel good about myself.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
13. I am worried about what other people think of me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
14. I feel confident that I understand things.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
15. I feel inferior to others at this moment.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
16. I feel unattractive.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
18. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
19. I feel like I'm not doing well.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
 
20. I am worried about looking foolish.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Not At All A Little Bit Somewhat Very Much Extremely 
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State Shame and Guilt Scale, Shame subscale  
(SSGS; Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 1994) 
The following are some statements which may or may not describe how you are feeling 
right now. Please rate each statement using the 5-point scale below. Remember to rate 
each statement based on how you are feeling right at this moment.  
 
 I do not feel this  
way at all  
 
I feel this  way 
somewhat 
 
I feel this  way very  
strongly  
 
1. I want to sink into 
the floor and 
disappear 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I feel small 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3. I feel like I am a bad 
person 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4. I feel humiliated, 
disgraced 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
5. I feel worthless, 
powerless 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
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Appendix M 
Average and individual fear (SUDS) scores plotted over the course of the experimental 
tasks. 
 
 
Note. These scores were measured three times during Steps 4b and 4d of the study, 
resulting in six measurements. Average scores are plotted on the top and individual 
scores on the bottom of the graph. 
  
 104 
 
 
Appendix N 
Average and individual shame (SSGS) scores plotted over the course of the experimental 
tasks. 
 
Note. These scores were measured three times during Steps 4b and 4d of the study, 
resulting in six measurements. Average scores are plotted on the top and individual 
scores on the bottom of the graph. 
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Appendix O 
Average and individual low frequency to high frequency (LF/HF) ratio scores plotted 
over the course of the experimental tasks.  
 
Note. These scores were measured three times throughout the Step 4c of the study. 
Average scores are plotted on the top and individual scores on the bottom of the graph. 
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Appendix P 
Average and individual high frequency (HF) component of recorded heart rate variability 
scores plotted over the course of the experimental tasks. 
  
Note. These scores were measured three times throughout the Step 4c of the study. 
Average scores are plotted on the top and individual scores on the bottom of the graph.  
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